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RETALIATORY FIRINGS: THE REMEDY
UNDER THE TEXAS WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
by: J. Thomas Sullivan*
Worker compensation systems are traditionally thought to have
developed as a means of facilitating the industrialization of American
society by stabilizing employer liability for injuries sustained by
employees while at the same time maximizing the prospects for
employee recoveries based on loss of earning capability as a result
of suffering those injuries.' Their continued viability attests to the
economic needs of the production and insurance industries for regulating costs arising from work-related injuries and for avoiding the
2
multimillion dollar judgments now fairly common in tort litigation.
An important component in the overall fairness of the system, as
distinguished from the question of the fairness of the compensation
rates, 3 is the assurance that employees claiming compensation will
not summarily suffer termination of their employment as a consequence of filing a compensation claim. The purpose of this article is
to focus on the remedy for retaliatory firings under the Texas

* B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1972; J.D., Southern Methodist University,
1976; LL.M.,. University of Texas at Austin, 1983; member of the Texas, New Mexico and
Colorado bars. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the thoughts of Paul W.
Pearson, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas, concerning the remedy for retaliatory discharge and
approaches to litigating improper termination actions.
1. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WoRMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 5.20-5.30 (1985)
[hereinafter LARtsoN].
2. A response to large verdicts can be seen in the adoption of section 11.02(a) of article
.4590i limits recovery in medical malpractice actions to $500,000 in damages other than medical
expenses and in section 11.03, which limits recovery for non-economic loss-pain and suffering,
mental anguish, consortium and disfigurement-to $150,000 in the event the damage limitation
of section 11.02(a) should be declared unconstitutional. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.

4590i, §§ 11.02(a) & 11.03 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The damages limitation was declared
unconstitutional in Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984),
writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 714 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986). In its per curiam opinion, the
supreme court held that the appellate court need not have passed on the constitional question.
714 S.W.2d at 310. But See Rose v. Doctors Hosp. Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. App.Dallas 1987, no writ) (holding that damage limitations under the medical malpractice claims
statute does not offend the "open courts doctrine" of article 1, section 13 of the Texas
Constition since the limitation on recovery does not bar recovery on claims).
3. See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 2.50.
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Workers' Compensation Act 4 (the Act) and the problems associated
with actions brought under the statute, with suggestions for enhancing
the deterrent effects of the provision by strengthening the claimant's
position at trial, where necessary.
Generally, the provision authorizing an action for retaliatory
firing, article 8307c, 5 must be viewed as an exception to the traditional
doctrine of "employment at will" found in Texas law. 6 While other
statutory authorization for retaliatory firings does exist in Texas law, 7
the cause of action is usually seen as totally dependent on legislative
expression for exception to the "at will" approach taken by Texas
courts.' Thus, in Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ,9 the Fifth
Circuit reversed a substantial damage award in an action predicated
on the employer's alleged termination of the employee as a consequence of the latter's truthful deposition testimony which was adverse
to the employer.' 0 The court, after surveying Texas law," could find
no basis for holding that the state would recognize an exception to
the doctrine of "at will employment" based on the public policy
goal of encouraging truthful testimony in judicial proceedings. 2

4.

See TEx.

REV. CrV. STAT.

ANN.

art.

8306-8309-1

(Vernon 1967 & Supp.

1987)

[hereinafter the Act].
5. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1987).
6. See East Line & R.R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888);
Julian, Good Cause, Bad Cause, or No Cause at All: Does it Matter in Texas?, 17 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1477 (1986); Comment, The At-Will Doctrine: A Proposal to Modify the Texas
Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667 (1984).
7. See, e.g., TEX. RaV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5207a (Vernon 1987) (discharge based on
membership or nonmembership in union prohibited); Id. art. 5765 § 7A (Vernon Supp. 1987)
(discharge based on employee's active duty in state military forces prohibited); Id. art. 5221k
§ 5.01 (Vernon 1987) (discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, age
or sex prohibited).
8. See Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734-35 (Tex. 1985) (noting
legislative action in creating causes of action for termination based on factors noted in note
7, supra). The court observed that while exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine have
been created by the legislature, the doctrine itself is of judicial origin and thus subject to
judicial modification. Id. at 735.
9. 651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981).
10. Id. at 1053.
11. Id. at 1055.
12. Id. at 1055-56. See also id. at 1055 n.5 (discussing plaintiff's theory of the lawsuit
based on a limited "public policy exception" to the rule of "at-will" termination.). An
argument can be made that the defendant's conduct may have violated a Texas criminal
statute, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987), (prohibiting interference with
testimony to be given by a witness in an official proceeding).
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While commentators have criticized the doctrine,13 recent case
law demonstrates some shift in the thinking of the Texas Supreme
Court on the adequacy of cause for termination of an employee not
employed pursuant to a contract defining a definite term or period
of employment. As recently as 1982, the supreme court declined to
review a decision by the Austin Court of Appeals denying a right of
recovery for a nurse reporting inadequate nursing home care who
14
was subsequently terminated in Maus v. National Living Centers.
Then, in Sabine Pilot Service v. Hauck, 5 the supreme court held in
1985 that an employee does have a cause of action for wrongful
termination where the firing results from the employee's refusal to
perform an illegal act at the insistence of the employer. 1 6 The Hauck
court did not discuss Maus in recognizing the cause of action,17 but,
as has been suggested, it is quite difficult to distinguish between the
requirement by the employer of performance of an illegal act as
giving rise to a cause of action based on refusal and consequent
termination, and termination based on the employee's disclosure of
information when non-disclosure itself may constitute an illegal act.' 8
Public policy concerns would appear not to justify such a distinction, 19 leading to the inference that Maus was impliedly rejected by
the Hauck court unless a greater element of wilfulness on the
employer's part seems to have attended the command to the employee
20
to engage in illegality.
13. See Julian, supra note 6; and BAYLOR Comment, supra note 6. See also Comment,
Action for Wrongful Discharge of an Employee, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 883, 883-84 (1984) (arguing
for general cause of action for wrongful discharge and specifically criticizing "at-will"
employment doctrine).
14. 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
16. Id.at 735.
17. See id.
18. See Julian, supra note 6, at 1479.
19. In Hauck, the precise holding of the court in defining the narrow judicial exception
to the "at-will" doctrine was:
We now hold that public policy, as expressed in the laws of this state and the
United States which carry criminal penalties, requires a very narrow exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine announced in East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott.
That narrow exception covers only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason
that the employee refused to perform an illegal act. We further hold that in the
trial of such a case it is the plaintiff's burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his discharge was for no reason other than his refusal to perform an
illegal act.
687 S.W.2d at 735.
20. The only plausible distinction would be that in Hauck the retaliatory firing followed
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The evolution of wrongful discharge law may well reflect a
generalization of concern for the rights of employees, specifically
exemplified by the legislature's action in creating the remedy for
retaliatory discharge under the compensation act."' Nevertheless, because the Act places the burden on the employee to prove the intent
of the employer in discharging him, the remedy created may not so
22
clearly afford the discharged employee a viable cause of action.
This problem exists because sophisticated employers are not likely to
make termination decisions in a manner so obvious as to establish
the violation. Moreover, the interpretation given the scope of the
remedy may be unreasonably narrow in terms of affording the
employee the truly just measure of compensation necessary to implement the goals of the legislature in enacting article 8307c.
I.

PROBLEMS OF PROOF

The most critical problem for an illegally discharged employee
seeking redress is establishing the employer's retaliatory motive in
terminating the employment. 2 Texas decisions demonstrate that the
burden of proof can be met, but also point to the problems of proof

the employee's refusal to follow a direct order to perform an act violative of a criminal
statute. Id. at 734. In Maus the firing retaliated for unilateral "whistle-blowing" by the
employee. Maus, 633 S.W.2d at 675. This distinction cannot be reconciled with the stated
purpose of the public policy exception set forth by the court in Hauck. A number of federal
statutes protect "whistle-blowers" from retaliation for reporting violations of the acts involved.
See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982); Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 312(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (1982); Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
21. See Comment, supra note 13, at 888-92.
22. Absent evidence indicating the employer's illegal, retaliatory motive in discharging the
employee, the employee cannot sustain his cause of action for wrongful termination. In such
instances, the employer's illegal act will not result in redress or compensation. See infra notes
137-44 and accompanying text.
23. In a recent Texas decision reviewing a jury verdict in favor of the employee, VanTran
Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 708 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the
evidence showed that the employee's supervisor told him the following:
Mark, I thought you were going to come back and work for us. If you're intending
to come back to work, why did you go and file a workman's comp [claim]? When
you filed on workman's comp, we're going to punish you and I'm going to see to
it personally that you never get a job anywhere else.
708 S.W.2d at 530. Other evidence developed at trial showed that the supervisor called another
company after Thomas had obtained work there and told the employer that Thomas "had
suffered a back problem and was totally disabled to work, and had filed a lawsuit against
VanTran." Id.
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inherent in dealing with sophisticated managerial techniques which
may serve to obscure the true motive for firing in many cases. 24
A.

The Burden of Proving a Retaliatory Motive for Discharge

Article 8307c sets forth the statutory remedy for retaliatory
discharge resulting from the employee's action in filing a workers'
compensation claim or other action taken to institute a compensation
proceeding. 21 Section 1 of this article provides:
No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate
against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed
a claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim, instituted, or
caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the
Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, or has testified or is about
26
to testify in any such proceeding.
Section 2 provides that the "burden of proof shall be upon the
employee" in an action predicated on his or her retaliatory discharge
as a result of the exercise of the rights or options set forth in Section
1

27

The burden is most easily met by the employee when the former
employer has engaged in a pattern of conduct establishing hostility
directed at the employee as a result of the filing of a compensation
claim. In Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham,21 for instance, the employer
engaged in discriminatory conduct resulting finally in the termination
of the claimant's employment following issuance of a favorable award
for the claimant by the Industrial Accident Board. 29 The employer's

24. See infra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
25. See TEX. Ray. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The Act does
not require actual filing of a claim for compensation as a requisite for showing a retaliatory
discharge. The fact that the employer has actual knowledge of the filing or retention of counsel
to prosecute a claim may enhance the prospect of demonstrating, at least in terms of sequence,
that the termination followed an action triggering the protections of the Act. See VanTran
Electric Corp., 708 S.W.2d at 530.
26. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
27. Id. § 2. Section 2 provides:
A person who violates any provision of Section 1 of this Act shall be liable for
reasonable damages suffered by an employee as a result of the violation and an
employee discharged in violation of the Act shall be entitled to be reinstated to his
former position. The burden of proof shall be upon the employee.
Id.
28. 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
29. See id. at 560. The evidence showed that the employer illegally discriminated against
the worker apart from the termination by reducing his hourly wage following the pre-hearing
conference. Id.
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explanation that the discharge was due to unsatisfactory work on the
part of the employee was effectively rebutted by the fact that the
employee had twice been given raises during the period of time which
the employer had identified as the period when the employee's work
30
became deficient.
The pattern demonstrated in Santex is one which most readily
links the termination with the employee's action in availing himself
of remedies under the Act. The Waco Court of Appeals noted that
the employer's sentiments apparently surfaced at the hearing, when
the company president "became openly angry and upset toward
Cunningham, his attorney, and the representative of the Industrial
Accident Board.' '31
In other cases, the intent of the employer has surfaced through
equally unequivocal evidence as that present in Santex. For example,
in both Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp.32 and A.J. Foyt Chevrolet v.
Jacobs,3 3 the testimony disclosed that the employees' supervisors had
told them that representation by counsel in the compensation actions
was itself an impediment to their return to work. 34 In Schrader, the
claimant also testified that the company personnel officer had told
him that "since a settlement of appellant's compensation case had
'35
been made the appellee company could not put him back to work.
The irritation caused by representation was more bluntly testified to
in Jacobs, where the company's general manager "testified that
Jacobs was discharged because he would not fire his lawyer." ' 36 This
type of direct link in the testimony between the filing of the compensation claim or other action-such as retention of counsel-for
asserting remedies under the Act will almost certainly support the
retaliatory firing action.
37
The evidence developed in Murray Corp. of Maryland v. Brooks
shows both direct and circumstantial approaches to meeting the
plaintiff's burden of proving a retaliatory motive for the firing.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 579 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. 578 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, no writ).
34. See 579 S.W.2d at 536; 578 S.W.2d at 447.
35. 579 S.W.2d at 539.
36. 578 S.W.2d at 447.
37. 600 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Comment,
supra note 13, at 889.
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Deposition testimony showed that the increase in compensation premiums resulting from the employee's filing of a claim was considered
as a factor in his termination.38 An important circumstance refuting
the employer's subsequent explanation for the firing was the employer's post-recession decision not to rehire only two previous
employees, both of whom had filed compensation claims.3 9
The reliance on circumstantial, rather than direct evidence of
the employer's intent in terminating the employee is often necessary
in order to establish the prima facie case. Because of the necessity
for reliance on circumstantial evidence in some cases, the Santex
decision includes an extremely significant rule for proof of the
violation. 40 There, the court held that the claimant had only to prove
that the filing of the claim was only a reason for his termination,
rather than the reason. 41 Thus, the employer's effort to create a
justification after the fact of the firing is not necessarily dispositive
of the issue as to the intent motivating the firing, even though the
explanation may be plausible. Three of the most compelling circumstances which support an inference that the true intent for termination
is the filing of a claim for compensation are: (1) absence of another,
legitimate cause for the termination existing prior to the filing of the
claim; (2) negative attitudes expressed toward the employee's medical
treatment and recovery from injury; and (3) circumstances surrounding the termination of other employees, specifically terminations
following the filings of claims for compensation.
1.

Lack of Justifiable Cause for Termination

The most obvious advantage for the claimant forced to rely on
circumstantial evidence of the employer's illegal intent in terminating

38. Id. at 901.
39. Id. at 902.
40. 618 S.W.2d at 559.
41. Id. at 559-60. In fact, the court rejected the employer's argument that there was a
"hopeless conflict" between the jury findings that the employee was charged both because of
the filing of the claim and, in response to the employer's requested special issue, because his
work performance had been unsatisfactory. Id. at 560. The court reasoned: "[U]nder our view
of the case, we have held that the employee has a cause of action if he is discharged because
he filed a Worker's Compensation claim, even though this was not the only reason for such
discharge." Id. See also Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1986), aff'd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987) (following Santex in holding that the discharged
employee need not prove that the filing of the claim for compensation was the sole cause for
her dismissal, but merely a cause).
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the contract of employment is the absence of other justification for
the termination. 42 Once the plaintiff establishes a causal link between
the firing and the filing of the workers' compensation claim, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove a non-retaliatory motive for
the termination of employment as the court held in Hughes Tool
Co. v. Richards.43 While the decision does reinforce the statutory
44
burden placed on the plaintiff in the suit for retaliatory discharge,
the shift in this burden is of perhaps greater significance since the
45
plaintiff routinely bears the burden of proof in any civil action.
The shift in the burden here, however, significantly restricts the
employer's otherwise secure reliance on the Texas tradition of "at
will" employment. 6 Despite the rule that the employer could have
fired the employee without any cause or good reason prior to the
filing of the claim, 47 once the claim precedes termination and suggests
the causal link, the employer is virtually required to demonstrate
4
good cause to support the firing.

In Santex, for example, the employer's attempt to justify the
termination based on a claim of poor job performance by the
employee was effectively rebutted by evidence that during that period
of alleged unsatisfactory performance the employee was twice given

42. For example, in VanTran Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 708 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), two members of the employer's management team admitted
that no reason other than the filing of the compensation claim existed to justify the termination.
See id. at 530. The opinion relates that the production foreman testified that while he did not
consider the employee dependable, he had "evaluated plaintiff three different times and
reported that the employee will work out satisfactorily . . ." and that no reason appeared in
the plaintiff's employment file justifying his discharge. 708 S.W.2d at 531.
43. 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
44. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987). See supra note 27
(containing text).
45. See, e.g., Vance v. My Apartment Steak House, 677 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. 1984)
(reiterating general rule that plaintiff bears burden of proving all elements essential to the
cause of action he has pleaded).
46. See supra notes 6, 13 and 19 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. App.Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reaffirming the traditional doctrine of "at-will" employment
even in light of the fact that plaintiff's termination resulted from the disclosure of violations
of the standard of care required by law for nursing home operators).
48. In Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981, no writ),
the court rejected the employer's argument that the doctrine of "at-will" employment negated
any claim by the employee of a justified expectation of future or continued employment. Id.
at 559.
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pay raises. 49 The after-the-fact attempt by the employer to demonstrate a reason for the termination was not only inadequate, but may
have strengthened the employee's claim of an improper motivation
for the firing by circumstantially demonstrating the lack of credibility
in the employer's denial of an improper motive for the termination. 0
A similar fact pattern was demonstrated in Hunt v. Van Der
Horst Corp.," a 1986 decision of the Dallas Court of Appeals
reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the employer. The employer contended that summary judgment was proper
because the decision to terminate the employee had been made prior
to the filing of his compensation claim.12 The testimony adduced in
discovery showed that the injury was sustained by the claimant on
the very day that a termination slip had been prepared and that the
general manager fired him later that afternoon without knowledge
that Hunt had been injured within the intervening period. 3 In reversing the trial court, the Dallas Court of Appeals looked to the
prior relationship between the parties in finding that the evidence
4
raised an issue of material fact that precluded summary disposition.1
The claimant had worked for the company since 1956.11 The evidence
showed that the same general manager had decided to fire Hunt in
1980 and had filled out a termination slip to effect that decision but
immediately voided it.56 At the time of his firing in 1981, Hunt held
the position of Chief Inspector at the employer's Terrell, Texas
7
plant.1
Based on the prior action of the general manager and Hunt's
sworn testimony in deposition that he notified his immediate supervisor of his injury on the day it occurred, the court rejected the
argument made by the employer that "if it had decided to fire Hunt
prior to his alleged injury, the actual act of firing Hunt, which
occurred after his alleged injury, could not be causally connected
with his workers' compensation claim."" The court noted that the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 560.
See id.at 558.
711 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id.at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
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actual firing occurred a day ahead of schedule, according to the
general manager's testimony, and that the other summary judgment
evidence relied on by the employer consisted of testimony and statements by interested employees of the company. 9
The court noted other factors militating against the conclusion
that the company had carried its burden on summary judgment,
including the duration of employment; the fact that the firing occurred after Hunt gave notice of the injury; and the fact that the
termination preceded the scheduled date of termination, as claimed
by the general manager.60 Moreover, the court found Hunt's deposition testimony that the general manager had previously expressed
concern over the rising cost of workers' compensation insurance
premiums during meetings of the company's accident board as potentially quite probative. 6' While the employer contended that these
expressions by management merely reflected proper concern for employee safety, the court declined to accept this explanation as conclusive, instead indulging the inference most favorable to the employee
in resisting summary judgment-that management was indicating its
concern over premiums by improperly seeking to avoid payment of
62
meritorious claims.

59. Id. The employer argued that one of the witnesses testifying in the affidavit was
distinterested because she no longer worked for the employer. Id. The court observed:
We note, however, that in her affidavit Wadle alleges affirmatively that she was
a Van Der Horst employee on February 12, 1981 [the date of plaintiff's termination],
but she does not indicate that she is no longer employed there. We have found no
other evidence in the record that would show that Wadle is no longer a Van Der
Horst employee.
Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 80.
61. Id. The court related a significant portion of the plaintiff's affidavit in its opinion:
During a portion of the time that I was employed by Van Der Horst Corporation
of America, I was a member of the accident board. During meetings of the accident
board, I have personally heard Mr. Herb Hallett state to the effect that "Workers'
Compensation was going up every time someone got hurt and that we had to stop
it."
Id. See Murray Corp. v. Brooks, 600 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (management admits concern over rising compensation premiums).
62. 711 S.W.2d at 80 (relying on Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex.
1984) (reaffirming the rule that every reasonable nference from the evidence must be indulged
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and that all doubts must be resolved in
non-movant's favor)).
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The Dallas court decided another important legal issue in favor
of the claimant in its Hunt decision. The defense had argued that
because no claim had formally been filed at the time of the termination, the firing could not be shown to have been the result of the
63
employee's attempt to avail himself of the remedies of the Act.
Relying on Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas,64 the court concluded that
the causal link between the firing and institution of a compensation
claim could be shown even though termination preceded the filing
of the claim. 65 The Hunt Court held:

In the instant case, Hunt deposed that, before he was told that
he was fired, he informed his supervisor that he had suffered an
injury on the job and that he was going home and to see a
doctor. We conclude that, in light of the purpose of article 8307c,
Hunt had at this point "instituted a proceeding" under the Act.
To hold otherwise would be to reward employers who are particularly adept at anticipating and quick in firing potential workers'
compensation claimants over those who are slower to retaliate.
At the trial on the merits, the trier of fact will, of course, be free
to draw whatever inference it wishes from the preliminary nature
of the proceeding when Hunt was terminated regarding a causal
connection between Hunt's workers' compensation proceeding and
Van Der Horst's termination of his employment. 66
This approach is important in tightening the potential viability of
article 8307c as a deterrent to retaliatory firing or demotion as a
result of the employee's expression of intent to avail himself of the
remedies afforded by the Act.
Santex and Hunt are significant decisions pointing toward the
appropriate response to an employer's after-the-fact explanation for
the claimant's termination. Even where the jury found that the
employer's explanation that the employee's performance contributed
to the decision to fire, the Santex Court looked to its other finding
showing that the jury was also convinced that the filing of the
compensation claim was a factor in the firing decision to hold that

63. 711 S.W.2d at 80.
64. 533 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. 711 S.W.2d at 80. Specifically, the court said, "In accordance with this purpose
[protection of workers entitled to compensation under the Act), it has been held that the
article [8307c] may apply to a situation in which the employee was fired prior to filing his
claim for compensation." Id. (following Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d at 115-16).
66. Id.
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the employee had met his burden of proof. 67 Thus, an employer's
plausible explanation as to the reason for the termination may serve
to raise a fact issue, but even an affirmative finding on a special
issue directed at this cause will not negate the possibility that the
compensation claim was also considered by the employer as a reason
6
to proceed with termination.
The employer's stated reason for terminating the employee may
indeed be sufficient to raise an issue of fact regarding the real basis
for the firing and where the issue is supported by the evidence, the
jury finding will not be disturbed. Thus, where the employer's
explanation that the termination stemmed from the employee's act
in making a false statement on his employment application and the
evidence supported this explanation, the court in Douglas v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co. 69 held that the finding favorable to the
employer would not be disturbed. 70 Similarly, in DeFordLumber Co.
v. Roys, 7' the appellate court reversed the jury finding for the
employee where the employer's stated basis for termination was
violation of company policies which were admitted by the employee
and where no evidence was offered by the employee-even including
his own testimony-to show that the firing was motivated by the
filing of a claim for compensation benefits and the hiring of counsel
72
to respresent him.

The easiest case in which to rebut the employer's stated reason
for termination will always be one in which the employer's own
records reflect that the stated reason is basically fabricated. In
Carnation Co. v. Borner,73 for instance, the employer claimed that
the reason for termination was that he was " '[pihysically unable to
perform assigned work.' " However, the evidence showed that the
employee had returned to his former duties some months earlier

67. Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also E-Tex Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Adair,
566 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ) (noting employer's justification
for termination based on employee's record of improprieties with female employees as credible,
but not sufficient to avoid recovery where employer also admitted that termination was
motivated by filing of compensation claim).
69. 617 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Id. at 719.
71. 615 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
72. Id. at 237.
73. 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980).

19881

RETALIA TORY FIRINGS

while awaiting final settlement of his compensation claim and that
no complaints about his performance on the job had been made
after he returned to work. 74 His discharge on August 10th, following
approval of the settlement by the Industrial Accident Board on
August 8th of the same year, was itself sufficient to establish the
75
link between the prosecution of the claim and the firing.
2.

Employer's attitude toward employee's medical treatment

The employer's negative attitude toward medical treatment necessitated by the worker's on-the-job injury is a circumstance highly
probative of the employer's attitude toward the compensation system. 76 In the absence of other evidence directly pointing to the
employer's retaliatory motive in terminating an employee asserting
his rights under the Act, circumstances surrounding the employer's
response to the need for medical treatment may be sufficient to show
an illegal motive for the firing. In Hunt v. Van Der Horst,77 the
Dallas Court of Appeals noted the significance of the seeking of
medical treatment for a job-related injury as an initial step in
instituting a claim for compensation. 78 Since the compensation system

74. Id. at 451.
75. Id.
76. For example, in Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1981, no writ), the employee testified that his supervisor had criticized him for filing a
worker's compensation claim, urging him instead to "try to collect damages from the insurance
carrier of the party who rear-ended" him. Id. at 560. In a similar vein, the worker's foreman
in Luna v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 683 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ),
commented on the company having to pay the medical bills incurred for the worker's treatment
for an injury sustained on the job. Id. at 802. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
77. 711 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
78. Id. The Hunt Court noted the significance of extending the remedy afforded by the
Act to terminations following an initial treatment of the injury which will pre-date the filing
of a compensation claim:
In the instant case, Hunt deposed that, before he was told he was fired, he
informed his supervisor that he had suffered an injury on the job and that he was
going home and to see a doctor. We conclude that, in light of the purpose of article
8307c, Hunt had at this point "instituted a proceeding" under the Act. To hold
otherwise would be to reward employers who are particularly adept at anticipating
and quick in firing potential workers' compensation claimants over those who are
slower to retaliate.
711 S.W.2d at 80. See also Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 697 P.2d 519 (Okla. 1985)
(employee terminated after receiving temporary benefits and medical treatment, but prior to
filing formal claim, had instituted proceeding for purpose of establishing retaliation claim).
Accord, Roseborough v. N.L. Indus., 10 Ohio St. 3d 142, 462 N.E.2d 384 (1984).
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is designed to benefit the worker for loss of earning capacity as a
result of physical injury, the need for medical treatment is a threshold
matter for entitlement to benefits. Consequently, the employer's
response to the initial need for treatment or diagnosis may be highly
probative of intent where termination subsequently occurs.
In Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas,79 the evidence probative of the
employer's intent in terminating the claimant was principally developed through the attitudes of the claimant's supervisor toward his
need for medical treatment.80 The record showed that upon being
notified of the worker's injury, his supervisor "went out of his way
to get the doctor . . . to release him for light duty work at a time
when the doctor advised that his condition was such that he should
not be required to lift more than five to eight pound objects . . .,.l
When the worker overslept while taking pain medication and failed
to report to work at 6:00 a.m., he was fired by the supervisor.8 2
A recent decision by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, Luna
v. Daniel International Corp.,83 demonstrates that the employer's
attitude toward medical treatment sought by the employee may prove
sufficient to create a material fact issue precluding summary judgment. 8 4 On appeal, the claimant relied on deposition testimony which
had earlier been offered by the employer to support motion for
summary judgment. 85 The deposition recited that claimant's foreman
discouraged him from seeking aid at the company first aid station
the day after suffering an on-the-job injury to his eye.8 6 After

79. 533 S.W.2d Ill (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. See id. at 114-15.
81. Id. at 117.
82. Id.
83. 683 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
84. Id. at 803.
85. Id. at 801-03. For a discussion of the problems associated with reliance on deposition
testimony in summary judgment proceedings see Bryant v. INA of Texas, 673 S.W.2d 693
(Tex. App.-Waco 1984), aff'd, 686 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1985); Note, Bryant v. INA of Texas:
A New Splinter from an Old Log, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 277, 287-88 (1985) (criticizing court of
appeals decision in Bryant based on plaintiff's reliance on unobjected to hearsay in plaintiff's
deposition testimony in reversing grant of summary judgment for carrier who expressly relied
on depositions on file in the case in support of its motion); Sullivan, Litigating a Novel Course
and Scope of Employment Issue: INA of Texas v. Bryant, 5 RE,. OF LITIGATION 297, 302-05
(1986) (responding to criticism in the BAYLOR Note).
86. 683 S.W.2d at 802. Similarly, in Milner v. Stepan Chem. Co., 599 F. Supp. 358 (D.
Mass. 1984), the employee testified that his supervisors harassed him about reporting a workrelated injury in an apparent effort to maintain safety records. See id. at 359-60.
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consulting a physician and spending some amount of time off the
job due to transportation problems in getting to and from the doctor's
office, Luna was discharged for failing to return from the doctor's
office in a timely manner.8 7 The opinion recites that there was no
discussion between Luna and his foreman about worker's compensation benefits, but that the foreman did admit that the company
would have to pay for the doctor visit.8
The foreman's deposition
disclosed that the reason for the discharge was that Luna had failed
to return to work after going to see the doctor and suggested that
Luna would have been terminated as part of a larger layoff intended
89
to take effect that afternoon anyway.
The claimant's characterization of his foreman's attitude toward
his required medical treatment was deemed highly probative by the
court in terms of raising an unresolved issue of material fact concerning the employer's intent in terminating him. 9° His testimony
showed that the foreman was in a "bad mood" and appellant
perceived that he didn't want to do the "paperwork" or want the
company to know about the injury or doctor's visit. 9' Based on these
facts, the court concluded "that appellant's deposition testimony
regarding Cox's attitudes towards appellant's doctor's visit was sufficient to raise at least a fact issue as to the causal connection
between appellant's dicharge and his possible claim for worker's
compensation benefits." 92 Apparently, the Corpus Christi court would
sustain a jury verdict on the merits on the basis of evidence detailed
in the opinion, even if Luna were unable to offer any other evidence
sufficient to show the employer's intent in terminating him. 93

87. 638 S.W.2d at 802.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 803.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. If the testimony is sufficient to raise a material fact issue requiring reversal of
summary judgment, then it would appear sufficient to sustain a jury finding favorable to the
employee, at least against a "no evidence" claim. In the absence of additional testimony, an
appellate court might nevertheless reverse a jury verdict on the ground of factual insufficiency.
For an example of the distinction between "no evidence" and "factual insufficiency" points
of error on appeal, consider these sets of opinions: Deatherage v. Int'l Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d
181 (Tex. 1981); American States Ins. Co. v. Walters, 636 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1982), reversed, 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983). Perhaps the most cited single article in discussions
of Texas law concerning this distinction is Calvert, "No evidence" and "Insufficient" Points
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Reliance on employer attitudes toward medical treatment alone,
however, may be insufficient to convince the jury of the employer's
intent in terminating the claimant, even though it is sufficient to
raise an issue precluding summary judgment. 94 Comments directed
toward the necessity for treatment may simply be misunderstood by
an employee unhappy with an otherwise valid or justifiable discharge
and the jury may accept the explanation of management in the
absence of other evidence probative of the employer's intent. Moreover, some discussion of the injury, treatment, and recovery may be
justified as the employer's attempt to discern how best to provide a
substitute for the disabled employee, 95 or to make a decision based
96
on the employee's apparent inability to return to work.
3.

Patterns of retaliatory action

The decision in Murray Corp. v. Brooks97 suggests the significance of investigation of the employer's practice of dealing with
compensation claims generally as a means of proving an illegal intent
in the discharge of a given claimant. There, the employee bolstered

of Error, 38 TEX. L. REv. 361 (1960). It provides the best starting point for understanding
these approaches to issues on appeal. For insight into how the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
might ultimately judge sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal following jury verdict in Luna,
consider the court's opinion in Blair v. INA of Texas, 686 S.W.2d 627, 629-30 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reversing jury finding against worker, and for carrier,
in workers' compensation action on the issue of work-related cause of worker's heart attack.
The court concluded that the jury's negative answer to the special issue inquiring whether the
injury arose from the performance of the duties of employment was "against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence."). The decision in Blair may simply reflect the general
favor with which Texas courts look upon claimants in workers' compensation actions.
94. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the court, in Hunt v. Van
Der Horst Corp., 711 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ), noted: "At the trial on
the merits, the trier of fact will, of course, be free to draw whatever inference it wishes from
the preliminary nature of the proceeding when Hunt was terminated regarding a causal
connection between Hunt's workers' compensation proceeding and Van Der Horst's termination
of his employment." Id. at 80.
95. Similarly, the court in Hunt apparently regarded the argument of the employer that
its admitted concern over rising workers' compensation insurance premiums reflected a general
concern of management for worker safety as a legitimate interest of the employer. See 711
S.W.2d at 80.
96. But see Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. 1980) (employer's
explanation that the employee was terminated because he was " '[physically unable to perform
assigned work' " was rebutted by the fact that the employee returned to work three months
earlier and performed his duties without complaint from the employer during that period).
97. 600 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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his evidence of an admitted employer concern for rising compensation
premiums with a showing that the only two employees not rehired
after the company had laid off workers during a period of recession
98
had both filed worker's compensation claims prior to the layoff.
This evidence may not have been necessary in order to sustain the
plaintiff's burden, but it reinforced the admitted concern for rising
insurance premiums by showing the implementation of a policy
designed to either limit the filing of claims or to simply free the
employer of previously injured employees who might arguably be
susceptible to repetitive injury. At a minimum, the two employees
not rehired had previously filed claims and could be expected to
assert their rights under the Act if injured again.
An early discussion of the adoption of article 8307c points to
the prevalence of retaliatory firing as a practice among employers,
at least prior to the adoption of the provision.9 9 One study showed
that a single employer had apparently fired 37 of 49 employees filing
compensation claims in the two-year period surveyed.I°° The adoption
of the provision recognizing the action for retaliatory firing must be
seen, moreover, as evidence of the legislature's concern that retaliation for the institution of compensation claims was either a widespread practice in Texas industry, or of such concern in isolated
instances that the remedy was necessary to combat this motive for
termination. 101
It is likely, of course, that the adoption of article 8307c has
achieved its desired purpose in reducing retaliation as an acceptable
motive for termination among Texas employers. At a minimum,
adoption of the remedy has probably caused employers to avoid the
appearance of an illegal motive in terminating injured workers when,
in fact, that is the true motivation for discharge. Regardless of the
true impact of the statute, one must assume that the incidence of
retaliatory firing is now less common than prior to the enactment of
article 8307c. Thus, evidence of a common practice or scheme in
terminating employees who have filed compensation claims, while

98. Id. at 902.
99. Note, Remedies for Wrongful Discharge Under the Texas Workmen's Compensation
Act-The Need for Revision, 4 TEX. TECH L. REV. 387, 388-90 (1973).
100. Id. at 389.
101. Id. The author notes the nearly unanimous vote of the Texas House of Representatives
in passing the legislation creating the article 8307c remedy for wrongful discharge. Id. n.10.

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:85

likely more rare than in earlier years, should prove highly probative
of the employer's intent when the circumstances suggest a retaliatory
10 2
firing in an individual case.
Counsel representing the discharged employee should seek data
concerning the filing of compensation claims against the employer
and follow-up data on the status of those employees after the filing
or settlement of the claim. 0 3 This may require two separate requests
for production or interrogatories-one respecting identification of
company employees who have filed compensation claims and the
other focusing on terminations and demotions of employees within
0 °4
a reasonable period of time antedating the plaintiff's termination.
Comparison of the two lists of employees should afford a preliminary
basis for assessing the employer's pattern or practice of dealing with
compensation claims.
While the plaintiff's reliance on the employer's practice with
regard to dealing with other claimants through retaliatory means is
probative of the employer's intent in terminating the plaintiff in an
individual case, it does not follow that lack of a pattern of retaliatory
firings would be admissible in defense of the employer's explanation
for termination. Since the plaintiff's burden is to prove only that
the institution of a compensation claim was a reason prompting the
termination, that reason may exist uniquely for the individual employee and not reflect a general practice of retaliatory firing. Were

102. This type of evidence would appear to be admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence
405(b) which permits introduction of specific prior instances to prove character or a common
trait of character, or under Rule 406 which authorizes proof of the routine practice of an
organization to prove that the conduct of the organization on the particular occasion conformed

to the routine practice. See TEx. R. EvD. 405(b) and 406.
103. In Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fashing, 706 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1986, no writ), the court denied the carrier's petition for writ of mandamus to set aside the
trial court's discovery order compelling the carrier to produce the employee's entire claim file.
Id. at 801. The file had not been prepared in contemplation of the wrongful discharge action
in which its production was sought and, thus, could not be construed as privileged matter
covered by Rule 166b(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 802-03. The contents of
the file, moreover, might have been particularly relevant to the employer's intent in terminating
the worker.
104. An appropriate interrogatory might require the employer to identify all employees
having filed workers' compensation claims within the preceding five years; their current status
as employees; and, for all discharged employees, their dates of termination and the date of
settlement or other resolution of their workers' compensation claims as well as their current
or most recent addresses. The second interrogatory would require the employer to identify all
discharged employees and the reason for discharge in each instance, plus the most recent
available address of each employee.
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the plaintiff required to prove that the sole reason for termination
was the filing of a claim, an employer's otherwise clean record in
dealing with worker's compensation claimants would be far more
probative of absence of an illegal motive in the individual case since
one would expect that termination would be a more institutionalized
practice for the business. 105 The Santex rule, that termination does
not have to be solely caused by the filing of the claim, l° protects
those employees for whom the filing of the claim is the culminating
reason for termination.
Where the employer does show a justifiable reason for discharge,
however, the lack of a pattern of retaliatory firing would clearly
seem probative of the employer's good faith and legal intent in
terminating the employee. 10 7 The fact that an employer does not
engage in retaliatory firing as a general practice is consistent with
the explanation that the firing was for good cause. An example of
this type of situation would be firing for a violation of company
policy regarding safety regulations which resulted in the injury upon
which the compensation claim is brought. 108 In such a case, the
employer's explanation that the employee violated company policy,
exposing both the employee and perhaps fellow employees to injury
and the employer to the consequences of unsafe practices, could be
supported by evidence showing that other employees were not ter-

105. Such evidence might be admissible under Rule 406 of the Texas Rules of Evidence,
providing for proof of routine practice of an organization to show conformity with the routine
in a particular circumstance. See TEX. R. EVID. 406.
106. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. Compare the more rigorous burden
imposed by the Hauck court in recognizing the judicial "public policy" exception to the
doctrine of "at-will" employment. See supra notes 8 and 15-20, and accompanying text. The
plaintiff, proceeding pursuant to Hauck, bears the burden of proving that the employer's sole
reason for terminating the employment relationship was the employee's refusal to perform an
illegal act at the employer's direction. See Hauck, 687 S. W.2d at 735.
107. Once the burden shifts to the employer and a justification for the termination is
advanced, evidence of the employer's non-discriminatory routine in dealing with other employees filing claims would probably be properly admitted under Rule 406 of the Texas Rules
of Evidence. See supra note 102.
108. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Burden, 94 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1937) (employee
violating company regulation regarding wearing of respirator nevertheless entitled to recover
compensation benefits for injury sustained); Port Neches Indep. School Dist. v. Soignier, 702
S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming recovery for worker
despite employer's argument that employee violated safety instructions and that violation
resulted in injury). While compensation might not be precluded by violation of the employer's
safety regulations, the violation might justify discharge of the employee, particularly if the
violation followed a pattern of non-compliance or endangerment of other employees.
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minated when injured, particularly if safety infractions were not
involved.
In assessing the admissibility of evidence relating to the employer's general practices, it is essential that the trial court weigh the
probative value against potential prejudice as required by Rule 403
of the Texas Rules of Evidence. 109 If the plaintiff offers the evidence
affirmatively, it may prove so probative as to establish the prima
facie case when supporting the plaintiff's own testimony concerning
the stated or perceived basis for his termination.1 10 The trial court
should be less liberal in the admission of the evidence defensively
where the plaintiff has not expressly raised the issue of the employer's
dealings with similarly situated employees, even though the evidence
is arguably admissible under Rule 406 which governs proof of routine
habit or practice."' Unless the case is one in which the plaintiff's
case is devoid of proof of improper motive and the employer provides
a reasonable explanation for the termination, evidence showing absence of a pattern of retaliation may tend to obscure the real issue
in the case-whether this particular plaintiff was fired in retaliation
for having filed a compensation claim.

109. See TEX. R. Evrm. 403. Rule 403 directs the trial court to weigh the probative value
of relevant evidence against the potential prejudice to the opponent, if any, from its introduction, prior to admitting the evidence over objection. Id.
110. Admission of evidence of the employer's discrimination toward other employees,
offered to show the likelihood of discriminatory motive in discharging the employee, is proper
because the employee bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of illegal intent. See
supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. See also Smith v. Mallory Timers Co., 97 A.D.2d
571, 468 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 1002, 473 N.E.2d 733, 484 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1984)
(fact that other employees terminated as a result of economic conditions had been rehired
when claimant had not was substantial evidence that termination was effected in retaliation
for filing of compensation claim).
111. See TEX. R. EviD. 406. The apparent disparity in treatment of evidence of the
employer's action in other cases is justified by the proper application of the relevance test
embodied in Evidence Rule 401. See TEX. R. Evm. 401. Compare Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co.
v. Perez, 446 S.W.2d 580, 585-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(held that evidence that claimant's co-workers had not filed claims for compensation based on
lung disease was not relevant to the claimant's theory that his exposure to toxic substances in

the workplace had resulted in his development of pneymoconiosis) and Home Ins. Co. v.
Blancas, 713 S.W.2d 192, 194-95 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (evidence that
two co-workers had developed asbestosis was deemed relevant to the claimant's argument that
his own asbestosis developed as a result of exposure to the toxic substance in the workplace,
particularly in light of the expert's testimony that "it would be almost impossible" for the
worker not to have asbestos in his lungs in light of the findings relating to the co-workers).
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B.

ProposedDefinitions and Instructionsfor the Employee's Case

Given the problems of proof inherent in attempting to demonstrate an illegal motive in the termination of the compensation
claimant's employment, trial counsel should give considerable thought
to drafting instructions that correctly express the applicable law from
a posture fair to the plaintiff. Because certain characteristics of the
firing are likely to be present in most retaliatory firings, the following
suggested definitions and instructions are proposed as a guideline to
the jury charge in the retaliatory firing case. No effort is made to
duplicate those general instructions which are routinely given in civil
cases, such as the definition of the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence," 2 even though these might be tailored by
skillful counsel to fit unique factual matters that arise in the individual action.
1.

Instruction generally stating the applicable law

Trial counsel may desire a very generalized statement of the law
of article 8307c, broadly defining those acts which may be deemed
sufficient to constitute the "institution of a compensation claim" for
purposes of claiming the benefits of the statutory protection." 3 The
following suggested instruction may be modified to fit the facts which
counsel expects to prove at trial:
You are instructed that an employer terminates or fires an
employee in violation of the law when he causes or orders termination of the employee's employment as a result of the employee's act in [filing a worker's compensation claim],"

4

[hiring

an attorney to represent him in the prosecution of a worker's
compensation claim]," 5 [giving notice of his intention to file a

112.
FORM"

See 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES 10-11 (1970) ("SHORT
COMPENSATION CHARGE).

113. See supra note 78.
114. See Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981,
no writ) (employer criticized employee for filing claim); VanTran Electric Corp. v. Thomas,
708 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer questioned em-

ployee's intent in filing claim).
115.
See A.J. Foyt Chevrolet v. Jacobs, 578 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979,, no writ) (employer expressed anger over worker having retained attorney).
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worker's compensation claim],' 6 [giving notice of his intention to
hire an attorney to represent him in prosecuting a worker's compensation claim] " 7 or [seeking medical treatment or payment for
medical treatment for an injury sustained while at work, on the
job, or while engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business
8
or interests]."1

The bracketed alternative statements of the protections of article
8307c permit counsel to provide the jury with a general statement of
the applicable law tailored to fit the act alleged to have caused the
firing of the claimant, triggering the protections of the statute.
2.

Application of the burden of proof

The claimant in the retaliatory firing case bears the burden of
proving a causal link between the institution of a worker's compensation claim or proceeding and his firing."19 However, as noted in
2 once the employee
Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards,1
'
establishes the
"causal link," the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate,
non-retaliatory motivation for the firing.' 2 ' Trial counsel should be

116. Article 8307, Section 4a requires the employee to give "notice of injury" to the
cmployer within 30 days after the work-related injury is sustained, unless the employer has
actual notice of the injury, as a prerequisite to filing a claim under the Act. TEx. REv. Cry.
STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon Supp. 1987). Notice of filing has also been held
accomplished where a treating physician forwarded his summary of treatment and charges
showing a work-related injury to the employer's insurance carrier. Cadengo v. Compass Ins.
Co., 721 S.W.2d 415, 417-18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
117. E.g. Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer told worker he could not work as long as he had attorney
representing him on compensation claim).
118. See Hunt v. Van Der Horst Corp., 711 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ) (employer terminated employee upon notice of injury requiring medical treatment); Luna
v. Daniel Int'l, 683 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (termination
followed employee's report of injury and early departure from work to seek medical treatment);
Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111, 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (termination resulted from side effect of treatment necessitated by work-related
injury).
119. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
120. Id.
121. Consider Geddes v. Benefits Review Bd., 735 F.2d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where the
court held that the employee's burden is not the usual preponderance of evidence standard,
but a standard under which the employee ig entitled to benefit from all favorable inferences
which might be drawn from the facts; factual doubts are resolved in his favor. Id. at 1416.
The employer's burden is then to prove that the employee's exercise of his right to claim
workers' compensation benefits played no part in the decision to discharge. Id. at 1417. The
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careful to request an instruction sufficient to state the plaintiff's
burden and to explain the shift to the employer once the burden is
met. The following instruction can be tailored to the specific act
allegedly causing the employer's retaliation, such as the filing of a
claim or hiring of an attorney, or can express the burden in general
terms:
The burden of proof is on the employee to establish a "causal
link" or reason for his discharge as a result of the filing of a
worker's compensation claim or other action instituting a worker's
compensation proceeding. Once the employee has made a prima
facie case showing the causal link between the filing of the
worker's compensation claim or other act instituting a worker's
compensation proceeding and his discharge by his employer, the
employer has the burden to prove that there was a legitimate,
non-retaliatory, non-pretextual reason for the discharge.
The problem inherent in this instruction lies in the fact that it points
to the difficulty the employee may experience in establishing the
"causal link" between the institution of a compensation proceeding
and the firing. If the evidence is insufficient to make out the prima
facie case, the employer is never forced to shoulder the burden of
proving a legitimate reason for the firing.1 22 The following three
instructions are designed to address the situation in which the lack
of a legitimate reason for the firing is relied upon, itself, as part of
the employee's case.
3.

The "sole cause" instruction

In order to establish that the employer's motive in firing was
retaliatory, the employee must link the firing to some action triggering
the protections of article 8307c. 23 The Santex decision makes clear
that while other reasons for termination may be demonstrated, there
is no requirement that the "sole cause" for termination be the
institution of compensation claim proceedings.1 24 Instead, the claim-

application of this more liberal standard would clearly favor illegally terminated employees
who are otherwise unable to prove their claim of discriminatory motivation because of the
employer's sophistication in concealing this motivation for the discharge. See id. at 1418.
122. See Hughes Tool Co., 624 S.W.2d at 599-60 (employee's discharge followed his use
of obscene and abusive language at employer's medical department).
123. See Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no

writ).
124.

Id. at 559-60.
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ant is required to show only that his reliance on the Act was a factor
in the employer's decision to terminate. Trial counsel should request
an instruction such as the following:
It is not necessary that the employee show that the sole cause or
only cause of his discharge was his action in filing a worker's
compensation claim or taking other action to institute a worker's
compensation proceeding. Instead, the employee must show only
that his action in filing a claim or taking other action to institute
a worker's compensation proceeding was a reason for his firing,
even if other reasons for the firing existed.
This instruction should serve to limit the burden on the employee to
show only that retaliation for the institution of worker's compensation proceedings was a factor in the employer's decision to terminate
the employee. 12 5 In Santex, for instance, the jury returned affirmative
126
answers on two special issues relating to the employer's motivation.
One issue involved retaliation for the filing of a claim.1 27 The other,
however, focused on the employer's explanation for the firing in
terms of dissatisfaction with the employee's performance on the
job.12 8 The affirmative answer on the special issue regarding the
employer's explanation for the firing did not deprive the plaintiff of
a verdict in his favor based on the special issue concerning retaliation. 29 This principle must be clearly explained to the jury, since an
employer facing trial may be expected to offer a legitimate explanation for the firing, even if it is merely the product of hindsight.
4.

Circumstantial evidence instructions

The absence of a direct admission by the employer of a retaliatory intent in discharging the employee after the filing of a compensation claim may require that the employee prove intent
inferentially. Proof of an illegal or improper intent is often shown
by reference to circumstances and the logical inferences flowing

125. See, e.g., DeFord Lumber Co. v. Roys, 615 S.W.2d 235, 236-37 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1981, no writ) (appellate court sustained employer's "no evidence" point on appeal
where employee's trial counsel requested special issue which inquired whether the employer's
firing of employee in retaliation for the filing of a compensation claim was the sole cause for
the discharge).
126. See 618 S.W.2d at 558.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 560.
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therefrom, particularly in criminal cases 3 ° or in civil prosecutions of
fraud claims. 3 ' The plaintiff's circumstantial evidence instruction in
a retaliatory firing action may take the following form:
An employer's intent in terminating an employee may be established by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or both. A
fact is established by direct evidence when proved by witnesses
who saw the act done or heard the words spoken or by documentary evidence. A fact is established by circumstantial evidence
when it may fairly and reasonably be inferred from other facts
proved. The intent of the employer in terminating the employment
relationship with the employee may be inferred from the facts
surrounding the termination, [the prior relationship of the employer and employee],' 32 and [the subsequent conduct of the
33
employer toward the employee].'

The defense may object to this instruction as not requiring the proof
in a circumstantial evidence case to be such that the conclusion to
be proved by the facts and circumstances of the case make that
conclusion more probable than any other theory, conclusion or
hypothesis which might be drawn from those facts. However, even
in criminal cases, the "moral certainty" instruction which traditionally was required in Texas criminal trials 34 has now been abandoned "
and the newly adopted Rules of Evidence make no such requirement
that the jury differentiate between circumstantial and direct evi36
dence. 1

130. See Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (The Court of
Criminal Appeals discussed proof of criminal intent by referring to "attendant circumstances
from which the defendant's mental state can be inferred [which] must be collectively examined
in light of the definition of criminally negligent conduct.").
131. See Pulchny v. Pulchny, 555 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no
writ) (holding that intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence).
132. See Santex, 618 S.W.2d at 560 (the court noted that the prior history of promotions
or pay raises given the employee might be relevant).
133. See, e.g., VanTran Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 708 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. App.Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the court refers to the fact that after the employee had been
terminated, his supervisor, a vice-president of the company, personally called the employee's
subsequent employer to inform them of his back injury and total disability).
134. See Richardson v. State, 600 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (the court
holds that a trial court has a duty to give a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence).
135. See Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (on rehearing).
136. See TEx. R. EVID. 401. Neither the definition of "relevant evidence" provided by the
Texas Rules of Evidence, nor the comparable provision in the rules adopted for criminal cases
in Texas, differentiates between direct and circumstantial evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 401;
TEX. R. CRIM. Evil. 401. The civil rule provides the following definition: ."Relevant evidence'
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Presumption of "retaliatory intent"

Absence of direct evidence of "retaliatory intent" for the firing
of an employee who has instituted worker's compensation proceedings
may defeat many claims where the sophisticated approach taken by
the employer provides no indication of illegality other than the timing
of the firing. In order to fully implement the goals of the Act in
protecting employees from retaliation, and based on a liberal construction of article 8307c for the benefit of the employee fired or
discriminated against, 3 7 trial counsel should urge the court to instruct
the jury that the illegal intent may be presumed in some actions.
The instruction is particularly important where the only "causal link"
which can be demonstrated by the employee is the proximity in time
between the discharge and the absence of a legitimate reason for the
firing. 3 A sample instruction on this proposed presumption reads:
The law presumes that when an employee is terminated by his
employer shortly after the filing of a worker's compensation claim
or other action taken to institute a worker's compensation proceeding, the termination is in retaliation for the employee's action
in availing himself of the right to seek compensation for a work-

means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." TEX. R. EviD. 401.
137. Navarette v. Temple Indep. School Dist., 706 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1986) (holding
that the Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed in favor of the employee).
138. The District of Columbia Circuit Court in Geddes v. Benefits Review Bd., 735 F.2d
1412 (D.C. Cir. 1984), analogized the reduced burden of proof in a retaliatory firing case to
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in tort actions. Id. at 1417-18. Once the
negligent plaintiff proves a set of facts from which a reasonable conclusion of defendant's
negligence can be drawn and shows that the correct explanation of the event is more accessible
to the defendants than to the plaintiff, the plaintiff benefits from a rebuttable presumption
or inference that one or more of the defendants was, in fact, negligent. Id. In the dissent,
Judge MacKinnon argued that the specific finding of the administrative law judge that the
employer's animus toward the terminated worker was general and not attributable to the
worker's act in filing a workers' compensation claim was binding on the court and entitled to
deference on appeal. Id. at 1419-21 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
The majority's acceptance of the analogy to res ipsa loquitur perhaps reflects concern that
meritorious claims of discriminatory intent are so difficult to prove in most circumstances that
claimants are entitled to the assistance of a legal presumption to make their cases. See id. at
1418. Judge MacKinnon's approach, requiring "an initial showing that the employer's discrimination was improperly motivated . . ." under the applicable Act, would restrict recoveries
where the only evidence available to show retaliatory motive is the discharge itself. Id. at 1421
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Effectively, the "at-will" employment doctrine would serve to
protect those employers who are inclined to discriminate, yet are sophisticated in their approach
to the act of discrimination.
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related injury. The presumption may be rebutted by the employer
with evidence showing that the employee's termination was based
on reasons other than and unrelated to the employee's action in
asserting his legal remedies under the Workers' Compensation
Act. However, the presumption is not rebutted unless the evidence
shows that the employee's assertion of his legal rights was not a
reason for his termination. a9
No decision has been found in which such an instruction has been
given, challenged or approved by a Texas court. However, the
legislative requirement that the Act be given a liberal construction
for the benefit of workers virtually requires that in some actions the
employee be permitted to benefit from a presumption where the
necessary evidence to prove a claim under the Act cannot otherwise
be offered due to the particular circumstances of the case.
Thus, for instance, in Scott v. Millers Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., 14° the Texas Supreme Court recognized that an employee's
beneficiaries could establish that his unexplained death occurred in
the course and scope of his employment if his dead body is discovered
at a place where his duties would require him to be, or where he
might properly have been in the performance of his duties, during
the hours of his work.14 ' The presumption may be rebutted, of
course, by evidence showing that he was not engaged in furtherance
of his employer's business or interests at the time he suffered his
fatal injury. 42 Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Walters v.
American States Insurance Co. ,14 Justice McGee argued that a similar
presumption should benefit workers who sustain injury as a result

139. This instruction was requested by the plaintiff in Sikes v. Railroad Comm'n, No. 8513,282 (160th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, filed July 30, 1986). The Sikes
case was resolved by settlement of the claim prior to trial.
140. 524 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1974).
141. See id. at 288. For a discussion of the application of this presumption in compensation
cases see Deathrage v. Int'l Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1981), and IA LARSON, supra
note 1, § 24.10.
142. 524 S.W.2d at 288.
143. 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983). Compare with American States Ins. Co. v. Walters, 660
S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ) (opinion on remand). Three justices of the
supreme court would have concluded that the claimant was entitled to the presumption in
spite of the absence of any evidence that the death was attributable to a work-related cause.
654 S.W.2d at 430 (McGee, Spears, and Kilgarlin, J.J., concurring). The court of appeals on
remand found evidence sufficient to sustain the claimant's jury verdict at trial. 660 S.W.2d at
860.
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of assaults committed by third persons where the motivation for the
assault cannot be readily demonstrated. 144
Applying the reasoning of the court in Scott and the concurrence
of Justice McGee in Walters, the lack of direct evidence of retaliatory
intent in the termination of an employee who has filed a compensation claim should not bar the employee from at least forcing the
employer to show a non-retaliatory intent motivating the firing at
trial. The shifting burden requires the employee to first demonstrate
a prima facie case before the employer is required to even explain
his motivation for the firing. In many instances, however, the only
evidence of the employer's intent may be that inferable from the
timing of the firing. In those cases, the close proximity between the
filing or institution of a worker's compensation proceeding and the
firing of the employee should be sufficient, in itself, to establish the
"causal link" necessary to shift the burden to the employer to justify
the firing.
C.

The Relationship Between the Plaintiff's Burden and the
Proposed Instructions
The retaliatory firing case may be difficult to try and prove
because the very tangible type of evidence which accompanies other
actions in tort and contract may be missing when an employee is
terminated in a state traditionally dominated by the concept of "at
will" employment. One of the problems with illegal discharge actions
will likely be that the reported decisions will serve in some real way
to educate employers to avoid statements and acts clearly suggesting
retaliation as a motivation for the termination of an employee who
has filed a worker's compensation claim. 145 Although one may assume
that many employers have simply complied with the Act since enactment of article 8307c, the remedy afforded by the section is not
capable of eliminating discrimination by employers of a mind to
discriminate or retaliate.1' 6
144. 654 S.W.2d at 430 (McGee, Spears, and Kilgarlin, J.J., concurring).
145. Of course, the recent decision in VanTran Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 708 S.W.2d 527
(Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), demonstrates that not all blatantly discriminatory
discharges have been deterred by the reported decisions. See supra notes 23 and 42.
146. This would especially appear to be the case during periods of economic constriction
or recession when employers might be expected to attempt to control costs by avoiding
increasing premium rates for workers' compensation coverage through selective discharge
procedures. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
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Faced with the prospect of trying the lawsuit without clear direct
evidence of retaliatory intent, plaintiff's trial counsel must be prepared to demonstrate the illegal intent circumstantially. Of course,
where direct evidence is available, the burden of producing a prima
facie case will be easily met. The shift in the burden of proof to the
employer will then either open up the employer's fabricated justification for discharge to impeachment, having a potentially stronger
impact than the direct evidence, or will permit the plaintiff to argue
that a retaliatory motive is simply one among several motives where
the employer's other justifications are credible. In the latter instance,
the Santex-based instruction will be most critical in protecting the
plaintiff from a jury determination representing a choice between
47
likely motives shown by the evidence.
In the absence of direct evidence, an instruction on the law of
circumstantial evidence and means of proof of intent will be critical
in assisting counsel to explain that the jury is entitled to infer an
illegal motive from the circumstances of the firing. Regardless of
how favorable or unfavorable the circumstantial evidence instruction
appears to the plaintiff, the mere inclusion of the instruction in the
jury charge will afford plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to argue
that jurors should not disregard reason and common sense in evaluating the employer's actions. Such an opportunity is especially
important in those cases in which the employee's work record was
not itself objectionable or the employer can be shown to have
fabricated a claim of justification for the termination after the fact.
If the employer makes such a claim and is effectively impeached,
the impact of the exposed lie or rationalization may have a demonstrably greater impact on jurors than no offer of justification at
all.
Where the most probative fact that a plaintiff can establish is a
good work record and proximity in time between the filing of the
claim and the firing, the plaintiff's counsel should urge the trial
court to consider the presumption instruction set forth in the pre-

147. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text. In Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618
S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ), the defense strategy at trial was to rely
on a requested special issue requiring plaintiff to prove retaliatory motive as the sole cause of
the discharge and to offer another reason for the discharge based on the employee's poor
performance at work. Id. at 558. The employer succeeded in obtaining an affirmative jury
finding on the latter proposition, but the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on discrimination
as the sole cause of the discharge was upheld by the appellate court. Id. at 559.
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ceding section. 48 The presumption would serve both to provide a
legal basis for avoiding a directed verdict 49 and in affording the jury
a similar basis for evaluating the sufficiency of the employer's
explanation for the firing once the burden has shifted following the
evidence establishing a prima facie case. Moreover, the presumption
should prove especially valuable in cases where the employee seeks
to rely on the employer's inability to provide an affirmative justification to support his argument that the proximity of the discharge
to the assertion of rights under the Act demonstrates or suggests the
illegal, retaliatory intent of the employer.
Finally, the wording of the special issue should be considered
by counsel as bearing on the likelihood that the jury will answer
favorably. Where direct evidence has been shown on the issue of
intent, formation of the special issue is not likely to be critical unless
the issue seems to require the jury to find that retaliation constitutes
the single, or the most significant motive for the firing. Even where
direct evidence is strong, plaintiff's counsel should avoid the pitfall
of permitting the jury to simply choose between an employer's legal
and illegal motivations in determining whether there has been a
violation of the Act. 50 Otherwise, the verdict may be jeopardized by
competing claims appealing to individual jurors and the employee
may lose the benefit of the Santex decision.'' As a strategic matter,
the circumstances in that case point to an alternative means of
instructing the jury. To minimize the possibility that jurors will be
swayed by their concern for the effect of the verdict, counsel may
elect not to request the instruction on the "sole cause" issue. Even

148. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
149. A directed verdict is appropriate when there is no evidence of probative force to
support the plaintiff's cause of action or a necessary element of the cause of action. Murray
Corp. v. Brooks, 600 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. 1977). Application of the presumption
would serve to insure that the plaintiff established a fact issue requiring submission based on
an unexplained or unjustified discharge following closely in time his institution of workers'
compensation proceedings.
150. See supra note 146.
151. See 618 S.W.2d at 557. For example, in E-Tex Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Adair, 566
S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ), the court observed that there appeared
to be merit in the employer's claim that the employee had been terminated for misconduct
with female employees, as well as his filing a claim for compensation. Id. at 40. Had trial
counsel opted for a sole cause issue, the jury might well have found the employer's explanation
credible and been forced to answer negatively, even though it also had concluded that
discriminatory intent was present in the firing. See id.
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if the jury finds different reasons for the termination in response to
different special issues, following the reasoning of the Santex court,
the legal effect of an affirmative finding on the retaliation issue will
preserve the verdict.5 2 Thus, while counsel may want the jury to
understand in some instances that the retaliatory motive must only
be shown to be one among many motives raised by the evidence in
order for the violation to be established, in other cases, the composition of the jury may be such that counsel will simply want
responses to individual special issues in hope that the jury will find
the retaliatory motive supported by the evidence without regard for
the consequences of its verdict.
Phrasing of the special issue or issues will require counsel's
understanding of both the state of the evidence and the likely
inclination of the jury. In the relatively straightforward case, the
following form may be adequate:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff was fired or discharged by the employer as a result of
having filed a worker's compensation claim?'53
ANSWER:
We do
We do not

152. 618 S.W.2d at 560. The Santex Court held that affirmative answers to each of two
special issues relating to the reason for discharge-one unlawful under the Act and one lawfuldid not present irreconcilable answers requiring reversal. Id.
153. The special issue submitted in Santex read: "Do you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the Defendant Santex, Inc., discharged Jesse L. Cunningham because Jesse
L. Cunningham had, in good faith, filed a claim under the Texas Worker's Compensation
Act?" 618 S.W.2d at 558.
The instruction posed is far more favorable than that requested by the employer and refused
by the trial court, which would have required the jury to find that retaliation was the sole
cause for the discharge. See id. However, the reference in the issue to the causal relationship
between the filing and firing through the use of the unmodified "because" could have resulted
in a negative response had the jury interpreted the wording as limiting causality to a single
factor, rather than multiple factors. See id.
Moreover, the issue posed unnecessarily interjected the "good faith" issue unless the
employee's "good faith" in filing a claim had previously been raised and litigated at trial. See
id. The defense of "bad faith" apparently has not been raised in many Texas actions; the
question of whether the defense must plead and prove "bad faith" as a defense to the
retaliatory discharge action is unresolved. The issue appears to constitute an inferential rebuttal
issue which must be raised in a fashion comparable to affirmative defenses in compensation
actions. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Monn, 643 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sullivan, Unexplained Accidents and Assaults: The Problems
and Burdens of Proof Under the Texas Workers Compensation Statute, 16 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 875, 927-31 (1985).
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In a case in which competing explanations have been offered for the
termination and a single special issue is to be submitted, the following
form may serve to protect the plaintiff from the jury's perception
that it must choose from among the explanations:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that a cause
or reason for the plaintiff's discharge by his employer was the
fact that he filed a worker's compensation claim?
ANSWER:
We do
We do not

Counsel may well draft more appropriate instructions and special
issues paralleling the instructions given the facts developed in the
individual case. The proposed instructions and special issues provided
here are simply designed to demonstrate alternatives available in
producing the best set of instructions for the claimant at trial. The
important factor is that counsel give consideration to the importance
of the instructions in arguing for a verdict favorable to the client.

II.

REMEDIES AND SCOPE OF DAMAGES

Even assuming the terminated employee can survive summary
judgment and directed verdict motions, the question of the measure
of recovery authorized by article 8307c will determine the viability
of the statutory remedy as a means of true redress for a retaliatory
firing. The range of remedies afforded by section 2 of the statute
provides for reinstatement and reasonable damages suffered by the
54
employee as a result of the discharge or other retaliatory action.1
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the statutory
remedy is limited specifically to retaliatory acts by the employer
which follow from the employee's action in asserting his claim to
benefits under the Act. Thus, in Britt v. Sherman Foundry,' the
Dallas Court of Appeals held that a non-subscriber to the Act could
not be sued for retaliation since the injured employee could not have
filed or instituted a worker's compensation proceeding if employed
by a non-subscribing employer. 5 6 Additionally, certain employers,
such as state agencies and political subdivisions which are covered
by special applications of the Act, may not be subject to the remedies

154.

See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8307c § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987); supra note 27.

155.
156.

608 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See id. at 339.
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created by article 8307c unless the remedy has been specifically made
applicable to those public employers by legislation. 57 In the 1978
decision of Gates v. City of Fort Worth,158 for example, the court
reasoned that a political subdivision could not be held liable under
the statute for the wrongful termination of an employee, allegedly
motivated by the employee's assertion of his rights under the Act. 5 9
The remedies under article 8307c have been restrictively construed
as applying only to acts occurring during the employment relationship
and not to acts evincing discrimination in the hiring process itself.' 60
In Smith v. Coffee's Shop for Boys & Men, 161 the court held that
a refusal to rehire based on an admittedly discriminatory motive was
not actionable under article 8307c. 62 This restrictive interpretation
of the statute affords the prospective employer with an insulated
opportunity to choose not to hire based on the prospective employee's
prior history of compensable injuries or claims. 163 Such "lawful"
discrimination in hiring undoubtedly permits many employers to seek
to control rising compensation premiums by refusing to hire workers

157. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6674s § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (application
of remedy to Department of Highways and Public Transportation employees); Id. art. 8309h
§ 3 (application of Workers' Compensation Act to employees of political subdivisions); and
Id. art. 8309g § 15(a) (application of remedy to employees covered by State Employees'
Workers' Compensation Division).
158. 567 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. Id. at 873. The court, construing article 8309h, section 3 (extending workers compensation coverage to employees of political subdivisions), held that article 8307c had not been
included in those provisions expressly made applicable to political subdivisions by the legislature.
Id. In contrast, the legislature did make article 8307c applicable to state employees covered
by workers' compensation in enacting article 8309g, section 15(a)(7)(c). TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8309g, § 15(a)(7)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
160. Compare with OR. REV. STAT. 659:410 (1977) (prohibits an employer from refusing
to hire a prospective employee based on the latter's prior action in filing a workers compensation
claim against another employer). See Shaw v. Doyle Milling Co., 297 Or. 251, 683 P.2d 82
(1984) (holding actionable an employer's refusal to rehire employee replaced during period of
recovery from work-related injury); Morehouse v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 154
Cal. App. 3d 323, 201 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1984) (refusal to rehire actionable where court held
former employee covered by statute as "any employee" when employee's loss of employment
was necessitated by recovery from work-related injury sustained while employed with same
company).
161. 536 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
162. Id. at 84.
163. Compare Darnell v. Impact Indus., 105 III. 2d 158, 85 I11.
Dec. 336, 473 N.E.2d 935
(1984) (holding firing actionable where termination resulted from employee's claim against
previous employer). Arguably, article 8307c would afford a remedy in this same circumstance
since it would be predicated on an act of termination occurring during the employment, rather
than upon a refusal to hire.
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whose prior history indicates at least an understanding of the availability of the remedies under the Act. An inaccurate or false statement
on an employment application regarding prior injuries or workers'
compensation claims may afford the employer a defense to a charge
of retaliation if the employee is subsequently terminated after sustaining an injury on the job or instituting proceedings under the
Act. ,64
Finally, the remedies available under the Act may be compromised by the employee's election to pursue other remedies. In Thomp,son v. Monsanto Co.,165 the Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth
District, held that where the aggrieved employee exercised his option
of filing a formal grievance through his union pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement with the employer and the grievance was prosecuted through binding arbitration, the employee was barred from
66
relitigating the same claim in a state action based on article 8307c.'
However, where the employee elects to pursue the article 8307c action
before final resolution of a grievance filed pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement, his right to pursue the action through litigation

164. See Douglas v. Levingston Shipbldg. Co., 617 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer properly defended a wrongful discharge action
based on admitted false statement contained in plaintiff's application for employment, given
despite employer's express warning that false statement in response to any question in the
employment application would constitute ground for termination); accord Swanson v. American
Mfg. Co., 511 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(application falsified by employee makes application voidable by employer, but does not
preclude recovery for injuries).
165. 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
166. Id. at 877. The court held that the action under article 8307c was preempted under
federal labor law by the worker's decision to seek relief by way of arbitration pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement with the employer. Id. at 876. The state remedy was deemed
preempted by section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. Id. at 877 (relying on
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970)).
In contrast, the Hawaii Supreme Court has concluded that a wrongful discharge claim is
not preempted either by the collective barganing agreement or by federal law. Puchert v.
Agsalud, 67 Haw. 225, 677 P.2d 449 (1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Puchert, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985). And the Missouri Court of Appeals held in
McKiness v. Western Union Tel. Co., 667 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), that exhaustion
of the grievance procedure provided for in a collective bargaining agreement is a prerequisite
to maintaining an action for wrongful discharge. Id. at 741.
The validity of the court of appeals decision in Thompson v. Monsanto is cast in doubt by
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Ruiz v. NVMler Curtain Co., 702 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.
1985), cert. denied,
U.S.-,
106 S. Ct. 3295, 92 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1986), in which the
court recognized and relied on the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Puchert. Id. at
186.
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is not barred.' 67 A similar result was reached on the issue of whether
to pursue arbitration as an alternative to suit under article 8307c in
Carnation Co. v. Borner.'6s There the supreme court held that the
employer's failure to respond in timely fashion to a grievance filed
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement effectively operated
as a waiver of the election defense where the grievance had not been
169
finally arbitrated prior to the filing of the action in district court.
The court noted that the jury had responded to a special issue
directed at the arbitration question that no settlement between the
claimant and his employer had been reached on the grievance prior
to the filing of the lawsuit. 70
Not every collective bargaining agreement will cover the impropriety involved in an employer's discharge of an employee in retaliation for the filing of a compensation claim. Consequently, as the
supreme court pointed out in its 1981 decision in Spainhouer v.
Western Electric Co. ,171 the employer could not defend on the theory
that the employee had previously arbitrated the claim as a grievance
72
without showing that the bargaining agreement covered such a claim.1
In order to assert the election defense, an employer's duty under
existing case law is to show that the collective bargaining agreement
provided for resolution of the claim and that the employee utilized
the grievance and arbitration process to a final resolution of the
complaint. 173
A potentially more significant problem concerning availability
of the state remedy is the possible preemption of the state cause of
action by federal legislation. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held
in Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co., 174 that the remedy afforded by article

167. See Richard v. Hughes Tool Co., 615 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1981).
168. 610 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tex. 1980). The court observed that the remedy available
under the Act was broader than that provided under the collective bargaining agreement since
the employee could recover "reasonable damages" in a civil action in addition to the back
pay and reinstatement available through arbitration. Id. at 453.
169. Id. at 453.
170. Id.at 452.
171. 615 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1981) (opinion on motion for rehearing).
172. Id. at 191.
173. See id. (the court distinguished the facts from those in Thompson v. Monsanto because
in Thompson the worker's grievance filed pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement had
proceeded to a final decision).
174. 686 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), rev'd, 702 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1985), cert.
denied, __U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 3295, 92 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1986).

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:85

8307c is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' 75
in those cases in which the employer is engaged in activity affecting
interstate commerce.' 76 The court concluded that retaliation for the
filing of a worker's compensation claim fell within the ambit of
those activities which are defined as unfair labor practices by sections
7 and 8 of the NLRA. 177 Applying the doctrine of preemption, the
court held that unless the cause of action for retaliatory firing was
expressly excepted from the coverage of the federal statute, state
actions were barred by the existence of the federal remedy.' 78 The
court of appeals narrowed its holding, however, finding that the
retaliatory action of the employer in firing an employee who has
asserted a claim for compensation was not a per se violation, but
simply an implied violation of the national legislation. 79 In so holding, the court effectively concluded that a state action can be maintained if the employee can show that the retaliatory act of the
80
employer was not of common interest to other employees.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the San Antonio Court of
Appeals, pointing out the lower court's misunderstanding of both
the underlying intent of the National Labor Relations Act' 8 ' and the
role of the preemption doctrine in limiting state remedies. 8 2 The

175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1982).
176. 686 S.W.2d at 673.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 673-75. The San Antonio Court of Appeals expressly relied on San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), in holding that state actions for retaliatory
discharge are, at least in some instances, preempted by federal labor legislation. 686 S.W.2d
at 674-75. In Garmon, however, the Supreme Court held that a California statutory cause of
action for damages sustained as a result of peaceful picketing, collective action protected by
federal law, was preempted by the federal labor legislation. 359 U.S. at 245-47. Contrary to
the situation in Ruiz, Garmon represented a case in which state remedies worked directly at
cross-purposes or in repudiation of the goals of the federal legislation by seeking to regulate
activity protected by the express language of the federal law. See id. at 246-47.
179. 686 S.W.2d at 675.
180. See id. Accord Rhudy v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 S.W.2d 291, 292-93 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1983, no writ).
181. 702 S.W.2d at 184-85. The court held that the filing of a workers' compensation
claim by an individual employee could not be construed as "concerted activity" by employees
either protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Id. at 185. Justice Campbell noted that plaintiff
Ruiz was neither a union member nor employed in a shop governed by a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 184.
182. Id. at 185-86. The court observed that the Garmon preemption doctrine has not been
applied where the state's interest in regulating the conduct is substantial and does not interfere
with the federal regulatory scheme. Id. at 185 (relying on Farmer v. United Brotherhood of
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filing of the compensation claim which triggers a retaliatory firing is
not an activity associated with organization or representation. Section
7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities.... 183
Nothing in this section could be construed to concern the filing of
a claim for workers' compensation in an individual instance. The
court of appeals relied on language from the opinion in Krispy Kreme
Doughnut Corp.8 4 rendered by an administrative law judge in a
proceeding brought by the National Labor Relations Board, in which
the judge found that the employer violated the NLRA in terminating
the employee based on his expressed intention of filing a claim for
workers' compensation benefits.185 The Ruiz court apparently did not
consider the subsequent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in
Krispy Kreme which denied enforcement of the administrative law
judge's order on the ground that the filing of a compensation claim
by an individual employee did not constitute "concerted activity"
within the scope of section 7 of the Act. 186 The Fourth Circuit was
careful to distinguish between activity by an individual employee
which is designed to benefit other employees or the employee group
generally, and those activities by employees undertaken for purely
personal interests.187 While an individual act to enforce rights under

Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) and Peabody-Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir.
1980)). In Peabody-Galion, the Tenth Circuit had held that an Oklahoma statute affording
protection similar to that in article 8307c was not preempted by federal labor legislation. 666
F.2d at 1317-18. Other decisions following the Peabody-Galion reasoning noted by the court
are: Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658, 586 P.2d
564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978); Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 225, 677 P.2d 449 (1984), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Puchert, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985);
Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 40 Or. App. 427, 595 P.2d 829 (1979), aff'd, 289
Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980).
183. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
184. 245 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1053 (1979), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1980).
185. 686 S.W.2d at 675.
186. 635 F.2d at 306. See Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action Under the
NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 514 (1953).
187. 635 F.2d at 306-07. The circuit court observed that in some instances an individual
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a collective bargaining agreement may constitute protected activity
under section 7, an action asserting a grievance over personal working
conditions may be construed as personal to the employee and not
arguably within the ambit of "concerted" activity.'8 8
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Krispy Kreme undermines
the theoretical underpinnings of the court of appeals' decision. The
San Antonio court's further reliance on another administrative decision, Ohio Brass Co. ,19 was similarly incorrect. In Ohio Brass Co.,
the issue was whether the employer improperly discriminated in its
standard job application form by asking prospective employees if
they had previously filed workers' compensation claims.' 9° The Board
concluded that this action was not violative of the Act because there
were no actual decisions not to hire based on affirmative answers to
the question appearing in the application 9' and, further, because the
employer's interest in the health and physical condition of prospective
employees was legitimate. 92 The appellate court, in Ruiz, relied on
the concurring opinion of Board Member Zimmerman in Ohio Brass
in which he argued that the right to file workers' compensation is
an implied right under section 7, rather than a concerted union
activity expressly protected by the statute. 93 According to Member
Zimmerman, the filing of compensation claims arises from the employment relationship and thus can be presumed to be of common
interest to other employees, "absent evidence of disavowal of concern" by others. 94 Seizing on this language, the appellate court in
Ruiz affirmed the judgment of the trial court, dismissing the employee's action because there was no evidence present in the record
indicating "disavowal of concern" by other employees of the defendant. 95 In this instance, the court concluded that the remedy afforded

may act on behalf of others or for the benefit of others, including the filing of a single
grievance to secure rights guaranteed by the collective bargaining agreement. 635 F.2d at 30607.
188. 635 F.2d at 308 (citing Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir.
1949)).
189. 261 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 137 (1982).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 138.
192. Id.
193. 686 S.W.2d at 675 (relying on Ohio Brass Co., 261 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 137, 139
(1982)).
194. 261 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 139.
195. 686 S.W.2d at 675.
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by article 8307c had been preempted by the federal legislation. 196
The lower court not only erred in misconstruing the filing of a
compensation claim by a single employee as "concerted activity"
within the scope of section 7 of the NLRA;197 it also incorrectly held
that the existence of the federal legislation necessarily preempted state
remedies. 98 In reaching its conclusion that federal labor legislation
preempts remedies for wrongful termination created by article 8307c,
the court relied on the decision in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon'99 in which the Supreme Court held that the provisions
of sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA preempted California legislation
providing for a cause of action for damages resulting from peaceful
picketing. 200 Clearly, to the extent that picketing is a method for
achieving a concerted expression of labor interests, the California
legislation would have afforded employers with a means for countering concerted activity protected by the federal statute. The assertion
of individual claims for workers' compensation benefits and the
protections of article 8307c against retaliatory actions by the employer
do not conflict with the goal of protecting concerted activity by
employees engaged in organizing or in collective bargaining with their
employer. Instead, the state remedy, if construed in conjunction with
remedies created under the NLRA, should be seen as supplementing
or augmenting the rights of employees to assert claims arising from
the employment relationship. Rather than contradictory in nature,
the state and federal legislation actually represent parallel efforts of
the Texas Legislature and Congress to protect employees, individually
and collectively, in asserting legal rights arising from the employment
relationship .201
The Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Ruiz correctly responds
to the issues raised. The supreme court rejected both the conclusion

196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 674. The court held: "When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a state purports to regulate' are protected by section 7 of the NLRA, or
constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8, due regard for the federal enactment
requires that state jurisdiction must yield." Id.
199. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
200. 686 S.W.2d at 673-74 (relying on the holding in Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242-43).
201. As the Texas Supreme Court noted in its opinion in Ruiz, the state legislation is
designed to protect workers generally, without reference to union activity or collective bargaining. 702 S.W.2d at 185. Federal legislation expressly protects the rights of workers to
organize, make organization decisions, and bargain collectively. Id.
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that the filing of a workers' compensation claim constituted "concerted activity" within the scope of section 7 of the NLRA and the
application of the preemption doctrine to the remedies afforded by
article 8307c. 20 2 The court's unanimous opinion, authored by Justice
Campbell, also rests on its conclusion that the regulation of workers'
' 203
compensation law is "preeminently a matter of state concern.
Absent express congressional direction, Justice Campbell concluded
that Congress did not intend for the federal legislation to preempt
2
state legislative action in the compensation area. 04
Trial counsel should be able to comfortably rely on the supreme
court's decision in Ruiz to respond to any claims of federal preemption of article 8307c remedies in future state actions. The Texas
Supreme Court's holding does not, of course, preclude the possibility
that the federal courts might reach a contrary result at some point.
But as the supreme court noted, the weight of decisions from other
jurisdictions and the rejection of the Krispy Kreme Doughnut reasoning suggest that preemption is not a correct view of the interplay
20 5
of federal and state law in this area.
However, the protections of the NLRA might prove significant
in establishing a federal claim that a particular employer is engaged
in a policy of termination in response to employees asserting their
state workers' compensation rights.2 °6 Moreover, a Texas employer
retaliating in apparent response to the filing of a workers' compensation claim may also demonstrate a motive prohibited by the federal
act if the employee has previously been engaged in concerted activity
with other employees.2 07 In such a case, an election of remedies might

202. See 702 S.W.2d at 183.
203. Id. at 185-86.
204. Id. at 185 (citing Peabody-Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1317 (10th Cir. 1981)).
205. Id.
206. See id. at 185-86. The decision suggests that the Texas Supreme Court may eventually
adopt the view that the state remedy for retaliatory discharge is never preempted by the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 185. However, if the employee elects
to proceed to a final arbitration of his claim, an adverse decision might well be held to bar
a further civil action, extending the distinction drawn by the supreme court in Spainhouer v.
Western Electric Co., 615 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex. 1981). The court might, however, reverse its
approach and require arbitration as a prerequisite to the filing of the civil action, as the
Missouri Court of Appeals held in McKinness v. Western Union Tel. Co., 667 S.W.2d 738,
741 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
207. For example, if employees sought to organize to bargain collectively because of an
employer's prior history of discrimination against workers' compensation claimants, this activity
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be necessary, or joinder of claims in a single action might provide

an effective means for dealing with all discriminatory motivations of
the employer in terminating the employee without just cause.
A.

Reinstatement and Restoration as a remedy under article 8307c

Section 2 of article 8307c authorizes reinstatement of the employee to his "former position" upon a finding that his termination
or demotion was ordered in retaliation for his having filed a worker's
compensation claim or instituted proceedings under the Act. 20 8 If the
employee pleads for reinstatement to the position formerly held and
obtains a verdict or judgment supporting the retaliatory discharge
claim, the district court is empowered to order reinstatement pursuant
29
to statute. 0
Reinstatement, however, may prove to'be an entirely unsatisfactory remedy in the individual employee's case, principally because
the circumstances leading to the discharge can hardly be improved
if the employer is subsequently forced to "re-employ" the employee
after trial. The requirement of reinstatement does not provide a
remedy if, after a suitable period of time, the employer simply
decides to terminate for cause, or without cause, relying, at that
210
point, on the "at will" employment doctrine to support its action.

might be construed as protected under section 7 of the NLRA, the filing of compensation
claims already being viewed as an "implied right" under that section, as suggested by Board
Member Zimmerman in his concurrence in Ohio Brass Co., 261 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 137, 139
(1982).
208. For text of section 2, article 8307c, see supra note 27.
209. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Schrader v. Artco
Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 539-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
Vasquez v. Bannworths, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1986), where the court held that a trial
court has a duty to order injunctive relief which achieves the purpose of the legislation in
ordering reinstatement of an employee illegally discharged for union activity. Id. at 888. This
conduct is proscribed by the Texas Right to Work Law. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5154g (Vernon 1971). The trial court failed to order reinstatement after finding that the
employer violated the statutory guarantee of an employee's right to join a union. 707 S.W.2d
at 887 (relying on section 1 of article 5154g). When the employer refused to rehire the plaintiff,
the court held that the goal of the statute had not been met by the trial court's failure to
affirmatively order reinstatement as part of the relief granted. Id. at 888.
210. Unless the employee could demonstrate that a later termination was somehow causally
related to his earlier action in filing a workers' compensation claim, the employer's retaliation
might well be insulated from redress under article 8307c simply because of problems of proof.
See Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), off'd 734
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The likelihood that the employee can be restored to an enjoyable
working situation after discharge seems difficult enough, without the
intervening circumstance of a lawsuit concluded in his favor against
the employer. In considering whether to plead for reinstatement,
plaintiff's counsel should evaluate the potential consequences of the
request for this relief on the lawsuit in its entirety. Two possible
problems emerge in this respect.
1. The burden of proving the employee's fitness to work
In Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp.,2 11 the terminated employee
appealed from the trial court's order which did not order his reinstatement, despite a favorable answer from the jury on the special
issue establishing the employer's retaliatory motive in discharging
him.212 On appeal, he argued the evidence was sufficient to establish
his physical ability to return to his former job.2 13 The Tyler court

concluded that the burden is upon the discharged employee to "establish that he was physically able to perform the duties of the job
he had before his injury. ' 2 14 The court concluded that he had not
met the burden, particularly in light of his own testimony showing
that his ability to lift was restricted and that he continued to suffer
the same pains associated with his injury.215 In the absence of evidence
showing affirmatively that he was physically able to return to work
performing his former duties, the appellate court rejected his argument that the lower court's refusal to order his reinstatement was
216
error.
The Act does not require the employer to alter the employee's
duties within its business or operation to accommodate the employee's

S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987). In Azar Nut Co., the discharged employee was offered a job by a
company affiliated with the defendant and owned by the brother of defendant employer at a
salary equivalent to that at the time of her termination by defendant. Id. at 687-88. The
employee refused the offer which had been made after commencement of litigation. Id. at
688. Clearly, acceptance of the offer would have placed the employee in the uncomfortable
position of both compromising her claim for damages and subjecting her to future harassment
at the conclusion of the litigation. See id. The El Paso Court of Appeals effectively held that
the employee was under no duty to accept this offer in order to show a good faith attempt
to mitigate her damages. Id.
211. 579 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
212. Id. at 536.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 540.
215. Id. at 539-40.
216. Id.
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physical restrictions. The Schrader court strictly construed the statute
to provide that reinstatement can be ordered only when it can be
shown that the employee is able to resume the work he had previously
performed. 2 7 This limitation on the power of the trial court to effect
an equitable remedy shows an important problem regarding the right
of reinstatement created by the article. A seriously injured employee
who has been terminated is less likely to be capable of performing
duties previously done in the course of his work than an employee
who is less seriously or only superficially injured. The subsequent
termination not only means the loss of a job, but the ramifications
may include loss of employability and insurability, as well. Reinstatement would clearly provide a more favorable source of remedy if
the trial court were simply authorized to direct the employer to
reemploy the discharged worker in any capacity in which he could
perform the job duties, given the worker's post-injury state of health.
However, since the Act only authorizes reinstatement to the worker's
former position, the Schrader court's conclusion appears to correctly
express the more limited grant of authority to the district court in
fashioning a remedy for the retaliatory termination.
2.

Reinstatement and loss of future earnings

Reinstatement may preclude recovery for lost earnings in the
future, even if such loss of earnings has been found by the jury in
response to an appropriate special issue. Once the employee has been
restored to his former position, including restoration to seniority and
accompanying benefit levels, any claim that the employee will lose
additional wages as a result of the retaliatory action of the employer
in terminating him is almost necessarily inconsistent with the reinstatement. 218 To the extent that reinstatement does not include restoration of seniority and benefit levels, the equitable remedy would
not completely overlap with the damage findings by the jury. However, reinstatement does, by definition, suggest that injury for future

217. Id. at 540. Of course, the employee's inability to return to his former position of
employment is admissible in the typical workers' compensation action to show loss of earning
capacity. See Sterrett v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 236 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. 1951)
(observation of inability of injured employee to perform job tasks is admissible evidence).
218. However, the jury finding of loss of future wages might not necessarily conflict with
a reinstatement order if one considers the likelihood of termination in the future which cannot
be linked by evidence to the prior discriminatory discharge.
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consequences of the improper discharge has effectively been remedied.
Arguably, the trial court's power to order reinstatement encompasses the power to order restoration of seniority and accompanying
benefit levels in terms of retirement benefits, paid vacation and sick
leave, and other benefits attaching to the position previously held by
the employee.21 9 In petitioning for reinstatement, trial counsel should
consider development of evidence on the record which fully documents the terms and conditions of the employee's prior employment.
The evidence should document the actual loss sustained by the
employee as a consequence of the termination and support a more
definite statement relating to these matters in the trial court's order
ultimately requiring reinstatement. In the event the trial court's order
fails to fully restore the employee to his former position, the record
220
adduced at trial would permit counsel to seek further enforcement
or a more specific order through modification 2 ' to accommodate the
legitimate expectations of the reinstated employee.
The same factors which are discussed in terms of ordering a full
restoration of the employee's status prior to termination may also
support a substantial jury verdict on loss of future earnings and
benefits. Therefore, the employee may be placed in the position of
electing reinstatement or recovery for future loss of earnings and

219. Otherwise, the grant of power to the trial court contained in article 8307c, section 2
would be incomplete because it would permit the employer to penalize the worker for filing
the claim and the relief ordered by the court would not be complete. See TEx. REv. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987). In Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d
450 (Tex. 1980), the court held that recovery of damages by an employee could properly
include compensation for loss of "retirement and other benefits" lost as a result of the
discharge. Id. at 453-54. Thus, in reinstating an employee, the court would appear authorized
to grant relief sufficient to restore these benefits to the employee unless the award of damages
will adequately compensate the claimant for the full measure of his loss.
220. Rule 308 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "The court shall cause its
judgments and decrees to be carried into execution ..
" TEx. R. Crv. P. 308. This rule
authorizes trial courts to use the contempt power to enforce their judgments. See Various
Opportunities, Inc. v. Sullivan Investments, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, no writ); Reynolds v. Harrison, 635 S.W.2d 845, 846-47 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that trial courts have inherent authority to direct orders not inconsistent
with adjudication, and to make such orders as may be necessary to carry their judgments into
execution).
221. Rule 308 provides that the trial court may enter an additional order to assist in the
enforcement of its judgment so long as the original judgment is not so vague or imprecise
that it cannot be properly enforced. TEx. R. Civ. P. 308. Where injunctive relief has been
ordered as a part of the judgment, the order is enforceable under the contempt power set
forth in rule 692. TEx. R. Crv. P. 692.
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benefits. Although no case
providing for the seemingly
lost and damages for the
result in a double recovery
B.

law requires such an election, a judgment
inconsistent recovery of both the position
loss occasioned by the discharge would
to the employee.

Loss of Earnings as Damages

Section 2 of article 8307c authorizes recovery for "reasonable
damages" suffered by the wrongfully terminated employee. 222 In
Carnation Co. v. Borner,223 the supreme court held that reasonable
damages included lost wages and benefits, 224 and future lost wages
and benefits. 225 Clearly, damages in terms of accrued and prospective
lost wages and benefits are recoverable in an article 8307c action.
1.

Loss of earnings accruing prior to trial

The terminated employee's actual loss of wages and benefits
between the date of discharge and the date of trial can usually be
calculated with certainty, 226 although expert testimony regarding the
cash value of the lost benefits may be required. This information
may be available through the employer's own classification and
categorization of individual positions and their respective compensations in cash equivalents, and offered through stipulation or by
the testimony of the employer's personnel officer if expenses for
expert testimony are not available.
The Dallas Court of Appeals defined the correct measure of
damages in a lost wages claim in DeFordLumber Co. v. Roy

227

as

222. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
223. 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980).
224. Id. at 453-54.
225. Id. See Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
226. There is no requirement that the plaintiff specifically plead the exact sum claimed as
lost wages, except that the trial court may order the plaintiff to plead the maximum amount
claimed, pursuant to rule 47. TEX. R. Crv. P. 47. The plaintiff must request lost wages in his
pleadings. Phillips v. Vinson Supply Co., 581 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ). Examples of employee's proving their lost wages are found in the
following decisions: Carnation Co. v. Borner, 601 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980); Azar Nut Co. v.
Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 734 S.W.2d 667
(Tex. 1987); Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no
writ); A.J. Foyt Chevrolet v. Jacobs, 578 S.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1979, no writ); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. 615 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
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"that sum of money the employee would have earned, had he not
been terminated, less that sum of money which he in fact did earn,
from the date of termination to time of trial.

' 228

The DeFord court

concluded that where the record was silent as to the number of hours
and days actually worked by the terminated employee and showed
only the wage rate at which he had been employed, the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury finding that he had suffered lost
wages in the sum of $23,500 as a result of the termination. 229 The
opinion demonstrates the importance of establishing by testimony,
rather than conjecture, the work habits of the employee in demonstrating regular employment to permit the jury to properly draw its
conclusions. Instead of regular employment, the record in DeFord
showed that the employee had worked intermittently for the employer
and was only paid for hours actually worked. 2 0 The court observed,
"[tihere is no evidence of the usual or normal number of hours in
a regular workday, week, or month at either place of employment,
231
nor is there any estimate of the number of hours he worked."
This ambiguity undermined the jury's assessment of actual lost wages,
particularly in light of other testimony showing that the employee
had been employed at a higher hourly wage by another employer
23 2
after his termination and prior to trial.

In contrast to the record available in DeFord, the record reviewed
by the Beaumont Court of Appeals in E-Tex Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Adair23 3 gave the jury a factual basis for arriving at its lost wages
computation of $5,548.234 The employer's general manager was questioned and testified that similarly situated managers averaged earnings
within a given range and also testified to the average length of
employment of store managers. 2s5 The employee testified to the jobs
he had held and salary earned after his termination, and also as to
the efforts he had undertaken in finding other employment. 23 6 The
court concluded that the evidence supported a finding that he had

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
566
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 237.
at 238.

The jury answer was characterized as based on speculation. Id.
S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
at 38.
at 40
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suffered lost earnings of "at least" $5,548 based on this evidence
237
adduced at trial.

The burden of proving lost wages is properly placed on the
23 9
employee. 238 However, the court in A.J. Foyt Chevrolet v. Jacobs
essentially concluded that the employer bore the burden of proving
that the employee failed to discharge his duty of mitigating his
damages. 240 There, the employer failed to show that the employee
had not exercised due diligence in seeking alternative employment,
even though the record showed that only a minimal effort to find
other employment had actually been expended. 24 1 The employer's
burden in seeking to limit actual damages with regard to lost wages
should be seen as two-fold: first, the employer should document
through the employee's testimony and appropriate records the amount
of money actually earned between the date of termination and the
trial; and second, the employer should require the employee to
document his effort to obtain other employment, or employment
equally compensated as that lost, in the event the employee claims
an inability to mitigate damages through earnings at other work.
No Texas decisions have dealt with the pleading burden the duty
to mitigate places upon the parties. This matter is analogous to
defenses of avoidance and set-off, both of which must be affirmatively pleaded by the employer in its answer, pursuant to Rule 94.242

237. Id.
238. DeFord Lumber v. Roys, 615 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no
writ).
239. 578 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
240. Id. at 447. Texas courts have generally held that the burden of proving failure to
mitigate damages falls on the party alleging such a failure. Cocke v. White, 697 S.W.2d 739,
744 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref n.r.e.); R.A. Corbett Transport, Inc. v. Oden,
678 S.W.2d 172, 176-77 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
241. 578 S.W.2d at 447. The trial court found that Jacobs "made only a minimal effort
to obtain other employment." Id. The court concluded that the employer failed to show that
the minimal effort expended by the employer did not meet the standard of "reasonable
diligence" argued for by the employer in its point of error. Id. But see Azar Nut Co. v.
Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 734 S.W.2d 667
(Tex. 1987). In Azar, the evidence showed that the discharged employee was offered another
position at her former salary by a company owned by the defendant's brother but rejected
the offer. Id. at 687-88. The court concluded that the employee was not required to accept
the offer, tendered after she had begun litigation in order to mitigate damages, as required
under Texas law. Id. at 687 (citing Gulf Consol. Int'l v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.
1983)).
242. TEx. R. Crv. P. 94. Rule 94 requires that a party defending on the grounds of
"accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:85

If the employer has failed to plead the employee's failure to mitigate,
plaintiff's counsel should object to testimony on this issue2 43 and
further object to submission of any issue 2" which specifically asks'
the jury to deduct actual wages earned in other employment from
those lost through termination. Under Rule 279, failure to plead the
defense would appear to bar submission of a special issue on this
defensive theory 245 and counsel should timely object to the framing
of any issue which permits the employer to avoid the impact of
2
failing to plead its defense. 4
The mitigation requirement serves to further the interest of the
employer who violates the Act. An employee who is required to work
to support the family may suffer a loss of value in wage or a
temporary period of unemployment, but will likely have to continue
working in the interim between termination and trial in order to
sustain his household. To the extent that the employer is able to rely
defensively on simple economic reality, the intent of article 8307c
will be frustrated by the good faith efforts of the discharged employee
not necessarily to mitigate his damages, but to continue to earn a
living.

discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by
fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense"
must affirmatively plead the defense in responding to a preceding pleading. Id. See Hess v.
American States Ins. Co., 589 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
243. See generally Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 572 S.W.2d 273, 277 (Tex.
1978) (judgment must be supported by pleadings and evidence).
244. See generally United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Monn, 643 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (party not entitled to defensive special issue when not
raised by affirmative written plea and party has proceeded to trial on general denial only).
245. TEX. R. Crv. P. 279. Rule 279 requires the trial court to "submit the controlling
issues made by the written pleadings and the evidence, and . . . a party shall not be entitled
to an affirmative submission of any issue in his behalf where such issue is raised only by a
general denial and not by an affirmative written pleading on his part." Id. Rule 66, however,
permits a party to file a written trial amendment to his pleadings to specifically plead a matter
shown by the evidence, and case law requires that such trial amendments be viewed liberally
by trial courts and granted except where the opposing party can demonstrate unfair prejudice
resulting from the amendment. Id. See Chambless v. Barry Robinson Farm Supply, 667 S.W.2d
598, 601 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
246.
Rule 274 provides in pertinent part:
"A party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection. Any complaint as to an instruction, issue,
definition or explanatory instruction, on account of any defect, omission, or fault
in pleading, shall be deemed waived unless specifically included in the objections ..
"
TEx. R. Crv. P. 274.
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2.

Prospective loss of earnings

The supreme court has held in Carnation Co. v. Borner24 7 that
damages for loss of future earnings and retirement and other benefits
are recoverable in the wrongful termination action if reasonably
ascertainable. 248 The essential problem in establishing entitlement to
future lost wages is, of course, the re-employment of the worker by
the time of trial. If the employee has not regained employment, the
employer may seek to demonstrate lack of diligence in procuring
another position such that the employee has wholly failed to discharge
his duty to mitigate damages. In considering the issue of future loss
of earnings, counsel should be aware of the range of effects the
improper termination may have on the claimant's ability to get and
keep employment at a level of compensation commensurate with that
of the position formerly held.
First, if the re-employment of the plaintiff prior to trial has
actually resulted in a net loss of wages when compared to his former
earnings, the differential should be easily established through the
employee's testimony, as supported by past and current pay records.2 49 The employee is virtually entitled to rely on the benefit of a
presumption that he would have continued to work for the former
employer and enjoyed the customary promotions and pay raises which
regularly accompanied his former position 25 0 or classification as established through the subsequent work history of similary-situated fellow

247. 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980)
248. Id. at 453-54. The key to recovery is the "reasonable certainty" of the claimed loss
of future earnings. Id. at 454 (relying on Bildon Farms, Inc. v. Ward County Water
Improvement Dist. No. 2, 415 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1967)).
249. For example, in Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1981, no writ), the evidence showed that the claimant's wage was $4.00 per hour at the
time of the pre-hearing conference on his compensation claim. Id. at 560. Thereafter, the
employer reduced his wages to $3.50 per hour, apparently in retaliation for the favorable
Board award obtained by the employee. Id. After he was later fired, the claimant was employed
at $2.75 per hour by one employer and at $3.00 per hour by a second employer. Id. A simple
calculation of wage differential would have permitted both an accurate compilation of actual
lost wages and a basis for projecting future lost wages.
250. The supreme court implicitly approved a special issue in Carnation which asked the
jury to consider the following in arriving at its monetary damage award:
B. Loss of wages, if any, which Willie Borner, will in reasonable probability incur
in the future.
C. Retirement and other employee benefits to which Willie Borner would have
been entitled had he continued to work for Carnation Company.
610 S.W.2d at 453-54.
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employees. The court of appeals, in Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham,2 5
rejected the employer's argument that since the employee could have
been terminated at will in the future, unless such termination would
be in violation of article 8307c, the employee had no reasonable
expectation of continued employment by which loss of future earnings
252
could be calculated.
Second, the employee should be prepared to demonstrate efforts
to get and keep employment in the event he has suffered significant
periods of unemployment since his termination. In this regard, two
important consequences of the termination may be established through
both the employee's testimony and expert testimony relating to the
employee's ability to obtain other work. First, the fact that the
employee has previously suffered an injury which may have resulted

in loss of physical ability to perform work may be considered by a
prospective employer in assessing the fitness of the applicant for the
job sought. Neither the state statute nor federal labor law bars the
prospective employer from considering the applicant's history of

injury, and particularly, work-related injury, in making the hiring
decision. 2 3 Second, article 8307c does not regulate the employer's

251.
252.

618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
Id. at 559. Specifically the court said:
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider
loss of future wages as an element of damages, contending thereby that this is an
improper measure of damages because Plaintiff Cunningham was an employee at
will and had no right to be employed for any definite period of time. This argument
has been laid to rest by our Supreme Court in Carnation Co. v. Borner (Tex. 1980)
610 S.W.2d 450, wherein it was held involving an employee at will that under Article
8307c such employee may recover for the loss of wages in the future, retirement,
and other benefits which are ascertainable with reasonable certainty and are the
result of wrongful discharge.
Id. A reading of the supreme court's decision in Borner shows that the argument concerning
the "at will" status of employment was "laid to rest" by implication only, in part perhaps
because of Carnation's failure to make appropriate objections to the charge. See Carnation
Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d at 454 n.4. While the court clearly held that recovery for loss of
future wages was authorized under the statute, it is less certain that Carnation argued that the
"at will" employment status necessarily rendered such a termination impermissibly speculative,
even though Carnation did object that those damages were speculative and not capable of
calculation. Id. This premise was rejected by the supreme court.
253. In fact, in both Douglas v. Levingston Shipbldg., 617 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Swanson v. American Mfg. Co., 511 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the respective employees were terminated for
giving false answers in their employment applications to questions inquiring about prior filing
of workers' compensation claims. 617 S.W.2d at 719; 511 S.W.2d at 562-63. The courts, in

19881

RETALIA TOR Y FIRINGS

consideration of the fact that the employee may have filed for
54
worker's compensation benefits in deciding whether or not to hire,
as the decision in Smith v. Coffee's Shop for Boys & Men shows. 2 5,
Additionally, once a terminated employee has filed an action, that
fact itself is a matter of public record, which if known to the
employer, would suggest a third reason for discriminating against
applicants who have previously demonstrated their willingness to
25 6
assert their rights under the Act.
Third, even if the plaintiff has obtained other employment
resulting in mitigation of his damages for future lost earnings, a
significant loss of benefits, particularly retirement,2 5 7 may have nevertheless resulted from his illegal discharge. To some employees, the
loss of retirement benefits and the loss of participation in a retirement
plan will be a far more substantial loss than the prospective loss of

both instances, held that the employee's action in giving a false answer on the employment
application constituted a correct basis for termination. 617 S.W.2d at 720; 511 S.W.2d at 565.
However, given the conclusion in Santex, that recovery is proper if a retaliatory motive was
present as a factor in the termination decision, the Douglas and Swanson cases appear to have
been incorrectly decided. See Santex, 618 S.W.2d at 560. Even if the employer's decision to
terminate was justified on the basis of the false answers to the employment application
questions, summary judgment should have been denied if the employee could also show that
a subsequent filing of a compensation claim contributed to his termination. But see supra
notes 206-07 and accompanying text. If the employer uses the employment application as a
basis for discriminating against workers who have previously asserted their right to pursue
state remedies for work-related injuries-even if such discrimination is not unlawful under the
Texas Act-this approach might be construed as an action designed to frustrate organization
rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C
§ 157 (1982). The theory for an action brought pursuant to the federal act would be that the
employer's questioning about prior assertion of protected rights by workers is simply designed
to permit the employer to avoid hiring those workers most likely to assert their rights
individually and collectively. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
254. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1987). The act focuses on
actions of the employer during the term of employment. See id. Pre-employment discrimination
is not covered by the express language of the statute. See id. By analogy, in Carnes v.
Transport Ins. Co., 615 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the
court held that an injury obtained prior to the Iactual employment of the claimant was not
compensable under the Act. Id. at 912.
255. 536 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
256. That such discriminatory motive is present in employer decisions regarding personnel
is evident in Texas decisions. See supra note 253 (inquiries concerning prior claims not held
improper); notes 94-95 and accompanying text (noting that rising compensation premiums are
of legitimate managerial concern); note 61 and accompanying text (regarding admissions that
compensation premiums were a source of concern to management).
257. Loss of retirement and other company benefits is included in the measure of damages.
See supra, notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
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wages or salary, particularly to those employees who are readily reemployable. The value of lost participation in a retirement plan may
be developed through the personnel officer of the defendant employer, or through independent expert testimony given by an accountant or other professional experienced in evaluating retirement

plans.

258

Another element of damages for the terminated employee that
can be ascertained with some degree of precision is the loss of
insurability which the employee may suffer as a result of his injury,
and the termination of his group insurance as a consequence of his
discharge. Although the Act provides for lifetime medical benefits
for treatment necessitated by the work-related injury,2 5 9 this benefit

is often compromised in the negotiation of a settlement of the
worker's claim. 260 Even if left intact, the scope or nature of the
injury may preclude other coverage or require that the discharged

employee seek personal rather than group coverage, with an appropriate exclusion for the future treatment of the injury covered by
the compensation carrier's policy. The cost of obtaining personal
coverage or the fact that other insurance cannot be obtained as a
result of the work-related injury can be established by the employee's
testimony and documentation from prospective insurers who have
been contacted regarding coverage and policy rates. In the event the
employee is unable to obtain coverage, estimation of future costs of
medical treatment for similarly situated individuals would provide a
basis in the evidence for the jury to return a finding on the cash

258. In Williams v. General Motors Corp., 501 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref. n.r.e.), for instance, a professor of economics with a Ph.D. was
properly permitted to testify concerning prospective loss of wages and medical expenses to be
incurred by a plaintiff injured and unable to return to full employment, from data furnished
by the employer concerning salary levels and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics projecting
inflated value of wages and medical expenses. Id. at 940. See also Texas Steel Co. v. Recer,
508 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (economist could testify
on plaintiff's comparative earning capacity before and after injury); Texas & N.O.R.R. Co.
v. Jacks, 306 S.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insurance
agent could testify concerning loss of earnings based on life expectancy tables and annuity
table showing present cost of annuity comparable to plaintiff's expected earnings).
259. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
260. See generally Moore v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty. Co., 533 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (compromise settlement agreement limiting carrier's
liability for future medical expense to duration of 36 months and for services provided by
named providers only held enforceable).
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value of the loss of this benefit of employment. 26' If the employee
was previously covered by a group plan which includes his or her
dependents, evidence concerning the value of this loss of insurability
should also be adduced. Finally, loss of insurability itself suggests a
reason why a prospective employer might not choose to employ a
previously-injured worker whose prior employment has been terminated, thereby ending his group medical insurance benefits.
Other benefits, such as loss of vacation and sick pay accruing
on the basis of seniority, can also be established with reasonable
certainty, forming an additional basis for the jury's answer in response to inquiry about loss of benefits resulting from the termination. The key to keeping favorable answers intact on this type of
issue will be evidence in the record sufficient to warrant the jury's
finding, particularly since the expansive reading of compensable
damages by the court in Carnation Co. v. Borner 6 2 appears to
authorize recovery for any loss of benefits which can be ascertained
263
with reasonable certainty.
3.

Special issue submission

The Borner court related the following special issue submitted
at trial on the issue of damages for lost wages:
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find
from a preponderance of the evidence would reasonably and
adequately compensate Willie Borner for damages sustained as a
result of the discharge or discrimination, if any, by Carnation
Corporation on or about August 10, 1973?
Consider the following elements of damage, if any, and none
other:

261. Loss of "insurability" is apparently an aspect of damages seldom considered by
plaintiff's counsel in alleging the full range of injury suffered by their clients in personal
injury actions. In Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), the appellate court refused to reverse the trial court's decision not to order
reinstatement of the employee, despite the finding that he was wrongfully terminated. Id. at
539-40. The court based its conclusion on the finding that the plaintiff was physically unable
to resume the duties of his employment. Id. Assuming his termination also necessitated
termination of any group medical insurance he might have enjoyed as a benefit of employment,
the loss of employment may have rendered it more difficult for him to obtain comparable
insurance coverage at an affordable rate, even given the requirement that the compensation
carrier continue responsibility for medical expenses arising from the work-related injury.
262. 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980).
263. Id. at 454.
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a. Loss of wages in the past between August 10, 1973 and
today.
b. Loss of wages, if any, which Willie Borner, will in
reasonable probability incur in the future.
c. Retirement and other employee benefits to which Willie
Borner would have been entitled had he continued to work for
Carnation Company.
Answer in Dollars and Cents, if any, to each.
Answer: a. $24,768.00
b. $52,000.00
c. $44,000.00264

The opinion suggests that this special issue has been correctly
framed, although pointing out that Carnation objected only that
future damages are not recoverable under article 8307c, 265 a conten2 66
tion rejected by the Court.
The special issue does not include any limiting language regarding
the difference between accrued lost wages and actual earnings which
would have resulted in a proper measure of damages under the
formulation in DeFord Lumber Co. v. Roys. 267 Assuming that this
defensive matter is properly pled and evidence adduced supporting
the employer's claim of mitigation, the term "lost wages" could be
defined in a separate definition directing the jury to subtract actual
earnings from earnings which would have accrued had the employee
continued on the job.268 The "lost" wages or earnings would then
be those which the employee was unable to compensate for with
other employment.
Applying the principle recognized with respect to inferential
rebuttal issues, the mitigation of damages by the employee through
other employment would not require or justify a separate submission. 269 Instead, the proper means of directing the jury's attention to
this fact, if applicable, would be either to define "lost" wages to

264. Id. at 453-54.
265. Id. at 454 n.4.
266. Id. at 454.
267. 615 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
268. The use of a definition rather than a defensive special issue would comport with the
goal of simplifying the court's charge. See Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 572.
S.W.2d 273, 279 (Tex. 1978) (noting efforts of the court to provide simpler special issues).
See also, Walters v. American States Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. 1983) (noting
carrier's failure to request instruction on statutory exclusion).
269. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 277.
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include subtraction of actual other earnings from the loss in a separate
definitional instruction, 270 or to include this reference in the special
issue. 271 The following form would provide for this approach:

What sum of money do you find from a preponderance of
the evidence would compensate the plaintiff for the loss of wages
from the date of termination to trial, based on the employee's
wage or salary had he continued with the defendant employer and
subtracting those wages he actually earned during this period of
time, to arrive at his loss?
If the employer has failed to establish the value of actual wages
earned by the employee or has failed to plead the issue defensively,
plaintiff's counsel should object to this form of submission to bar
the jury from making any adjustment to the loss of wages attributable
272
to the firing.
C.

Damages for Mental Anguish and Inconvenience

In Carnation Co. v. Borner,273 the Supreme Court of Texas
allowed an employee to recover damages for "inconvenience and
mental anguish. ' 274 In Borner, the trial court instructed the jury on
exemplary damages in language which included the consideration of
"compensation for inconvenience and mental anguish suffered by
Willie Borner. ' ' 275 On appeal, the employer complained that exemplary damages cannot be recovered in an action brought under article
8307c because they would not constitute damages suffered by the
employee. 27 6 The definition of exemplary damages upon which the
jury had been instructed included reference to the inconvenience and

270. In A.J. Foyt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jacobs, 587 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, no writ), the court held that the employer has the burden of proving the
wages earned by the discharged worker subsequent to his termination in order to establish the
amount of wages "lost" as a result of the discharge. Id. at 447.
271. The use of a separate special issue for this defensive purpose would be authorized
only if the issue is not characterized as an "inferential rebuttal issue," which is not to be
submitted separately. TEX. R. Crv. P. 277.
272. See Id. 274.,
273. 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1981).
274. Id. at 454-55.
275. Id. at 454. "Mental anguish" is not a legal term requiring definition for the jury.
Trotti v. K-Mart Corp. #7441, 686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).
276. 610 S.W.2d at 454.

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:85

mental anguish actually sustained by the plaintiff.2 77 The court held
that the employer could not complain on appeal that the exemplary
damages awarded were not proper in the absence of an objection to
the definition given at trial . 7 The court did note that the definition
of exemplary damages given by the trial court was improper precisely
because it did refer to the psychological injury sustained by the
employee. 279 The court concluded, however; "because there was no
objection to the definition of 'exemplary damages,' which included
the element of 'inconvenience and mental anguish,' we hold that
20
these damages are recoverable."
The significance of recovery for mental anguish lies in the
possibility that this recovery will reward an employee who is otherwise
penalized by his good faith in seeking other employment which results
in minimization or mitigation of his damages for lost wages. The
more productive the employee, the greater the likelihood that he will
seek other employment to sustain his standard of living after termination. This employee may well suffer significant psychological problems from unjust loss of a job or career in which he has invested
considerable energy over time. 2 1 Use of psychiatric or psychological
expert testimony to document the stress and psychological injury
suffered by the employee who has unjustly been discharged, particulary when compounding any psychological injury associated with
the work-related injury itself, will afford the jury an evidentiary basis
for returning an answer to an appopriate special issue.282 Where the
firing has resulted in unemployment and the stress associated with
this status, expert testimony will provide insight into the problems
suffered by the terminated employee. The employee may also need

277.
Id.
278. Id. at 454-55.
279. Id. at 455 n.7.
280. Id. at 454-55.
281. Termination of the employee by the employer, particularly after the employee has
suffered an injury which in itself is career-threatening, would perhaps compound the psychological consequences of the injury. This is particularly true where the injury and subsequent
termination leave the employee unable to obtain other employement, given the limited period
of recovery under the Act for even a totally disabling injury, 401 weeks, except in cases in
which the employee loses the function of multiple body members. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 8306, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
282. See generally Peeples v. Home Indemnity Co., 617 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1981, no writ) (recognizing admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony regarding
psychological treatment needed by worker suffering work-related injury in addition to treatment
for physical injuries and symptoms).
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psychological counseling and the expert's diagnosis, prognosis, and
recommended course of treatment will establish the need for, and
expense of, treatment necessary to counter the detrimental impact of

the termination .

2
83

D.

Awards of Attorneys' Fees

None of the reported Texas decisions has discussed recovery of
attorneys' fees for the successful prosecution of the wrongful termination action, and this basis for recovery is not expressly authorized by article 8307c. In other statutory actions for retaliatory or
discriminatory employment actions, attorneys fees are often included
as a potential basis for recovery for prevailing plaintiffs. 2 4 Generally,
attorneys' fees are recoverable in Texas only in situations prescribed
by statute. 285 Most situations allow recovery when the action is
founded upon contract. 286 However, characterization of the wrongful
termination suit as sounding in contract as opposed to a tort action
is questionable. Since the remedy is designed to protect employees
from illegal activity, rather than activity in breach of the employment
contract, recovery on a theory of contract would appear inconsistent
with the nature of the injury and thus, would not support recovery
for reasonable attorneys' fees.
However, a plaintiff should plead for and prove reasonable
attorneys' fees. If the defense counsel fails to object to an appropriate
issue on attorneys' fees, the opinion in Borner, at least, suggests that
the issue will be treated as having been waived at trial, 287 or that
these fees will be construed as "damages" within the context of the
288
article and thus, recoverable.

283. Expenses incurred for counseling or treatment would be recoverable under the majority
reasoning in Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980), if reduced to an estimate
of a reasonably ascertained amount of money. Id. at 454.
284. The fees are generally recoverable as a statutory element of damages. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974).
285. See e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46, 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1987)
(authorizing recovery.of attorneys' fees for plaintiffs prevailing in deceptive trade practice or
consumer fraud actions brought pursuant to the statute).
286. See TEX. Crv. PxAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 1986).
287. 610 S.W.2d at 454 n.6.
288. Although attorneys' fees are generally not "damages" within the general meaning of
the term, they are sometimes deemed an element of a damage award, or a factor that a jury
may consider in setting an award, such as in the assessment of punitive damages. See Hofer
v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984).
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The uncertainty of recovery of attorneys' fees argues for legislative action in amending article 8307c to provide for recovery of
attorneys' fees in wrongful termination actions. Provision for compensation of counsel is essential to insure that this remedy is fully
available to discharged employees. The very circumstances addressed
by the statute-improper termination of employment-would support
a broadening of the remedy to include recovery for attorneys' fees
in order to insure that claimants with meritorious cases are able to
secure counsel prepared to represent them through the process of
trial.
E.

Exemplary Damages

In Azar Nut Co. v. Caille,8 9 the supreme court answered a

question that was left open by its opinion in Carnation Co. v.
Borner. Specifically, the court decided that exemplary damages are
29
recoverable in actions brought under article 8307c. 0
The employee in Azar Nut, Loretta Caille, was injured on the
job when a file cabinet tipped over, causing a flower pot on top to
strike her on the head. 291 A few days after the accident, Caille
experienced a ringing in her ears and began to complain of vertigo
and headaches. 292 These symptoms were subsequently included by
Caille in a weekly status report she filed with Azar. 93 Upon receiving
the report, Caille's supervisor rewrote it and deleted all references to
these injuries. 294 Caille then attempted to report the information by
supplementing an original report of the injury that had been prepared
by Azar employees.2 95 However, this proved unsuccessful because the
company clerk refused to sign the supplemental report prepared by
Caille. 296 That same clerk reported to the secretary of the company's
president that Caille was "doing something dishonest by reporting
297
the ear injury."

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
Id. at 669.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After filing a notice of claim with the Industrial Accident Board,
Caille was approached by her supervisor who demanded an explanation. 29 Attempts to discuss her situation with the president and
vice president of the company were unsuccessful. 299 Three weeks later,
Caille was informed by her supervisor that she was fired. 3°°
In addition to awarding Caille $167,464 for lost wages and
insurance benefits, the jury found that Azar acted willfully and
maliciously in discharging Caille, and thus awarded her $175,000 in
punitive damages. 01 The award was affirmed by the El Paso Court
of Appeals.30 2
In seeking reversal of the appellate court's decision, Azar contended that punitive damages were not recoverable under the language
of article 8307c. More specifically, Azar relied on the language of
section 2, which provides that an employer who "violates any provision of section 1 of this Act shall be liable for reasonable damages
suffered by employee as a result of the violation. 30 3 Azar argued
that an "employee cannot 'suffer' punitive damages, thus such
damages cannot be recovered under the statute. 3 °04
Looking to the legislative intent behind article 8307c, the court
declined to find that the word "suffered" restricted the types of
damages available to the employee.3 5 Instead, the court noted that
several preliminary versions of the legislation creating article 8307c
had focused on the types of damages available. 3° The court concluded
that the statute's authorization of "reasonable damages" does not
30 7
preclude punitive damages.
'"Reasonable,' " said the court, "seems directed more to the
amount of damages recoverable, or to the relation of the injury to
30 8
the damages awarded."

298. Id.
299.
300.
301.
302.

S.W.2d
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Azar

Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), aff'd, 734

667 (Tex. 1987).
734 S.W.2d at 668.
Id.
Id. at 668-69.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id.
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The court went further, stating that "the threat of punitive
damages is inherently more likely to restrain bad faith employers
from wrongfully terminating employees, and is therefore consistent
with the purposes of the statute." 3 °9
F.

Relationship of the "Retaliatory Firing" Action to Other
Remedies Available to the Employee Under the Act

Some jurors may be concerned that the employee seeking compensatory damages for a retaliatory firing by the employer will obtain
an unjust "double recovery" because of a misunderstanding regarding
the plaintiff's potential scope of recovery in the compensation action.
Trial counsel concerned about jury speculation on either "double
recovery" or the fact that the jury will misinterpret the motivation
for a separate action being brought for the retaliatory firing claim
can urge the trial court to instruct the jury not to consider the
underlying action. However, if the employer has asserted the defense
that the worker's compensation claim prompting the firing was not
brought in "good faith," the potential range of instruction is expanded.31 0 For example, if the good faith defense has been asserted
by the employer but the employee has received a favorable Board
award, settlement or judgment, plaintiff's counsel may request an
instruction advising the jury of that fact. Otherwise, an instruction
on the resolution of the underlying compensation claim may be
inappropriate or unwise, since it may give the jury a firmer basis for
concluding that the claimant is seeking a "double recovery" for his
injury. Instead, counsel may request an instruction along the lines
of the following directive:
When an employee of an employer or company which is covered

309. Id.
310. Generally, the decision of the Industrial Accident Board is not admissible in a trial
de novo undertaken as a result of an appeal by either party from the Board award or order.
See Tanner v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 438 S.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
However, a prevailing plaintiff in a compensation action should be able to plead compromise
of the claim, favorable Board award, or jury verdict where necessary to defend against a claim
that the retaliatory discharge was not occasioned by the employee's "bad faith" in filing the
claim for compensation. In raising the defense of "bad faith", the employer should be held
to have opened the door to a wide range of evidence available to rebut the charge. See, e.g.,
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thames, 236 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1951, writ ref'd.) (admission of notice of injury and claim proper in rebuttal to show no
discrepancy in claim).
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by the Workers' Compensation Act sustains an injury related to
his work, he is entitled to claim benefits provided under the Act
for temporary or permanent loss of his earning capacity resulting
from the injury. An employee's right to recover for such workrelated injuries is limited to the remedy provided by the Act and
he may not bring any other action against the employer for
damages or compensation for the injury.

To some extent, of course, a terminated plaintiff will experience
a double recovery if he prevails in both compensation and retaliatory
discharge actions. Article 8307c does not limit this possible double
31
recovery. The distinctive legislative objectives of the Act generally, "
and article 8307c specifically,312 warrant the conclusion that any
"double recovery" is justified by the legislative goals sought to be
achieved by the general and specific provisions. Just as the fact that
an employee has returned to work does not necessarily preclude a
finding that he has been totally and permanently disabled under the
Act, 13 this possibility of "double recovery" is justified because loss
of earning capacity and loss of wages are not the same under the
statutory scheme. The fact that the employee has lost wages as a
result of his discharge does not mean, for instance, that recovery for
lost wages will compensate him for the loss of earning capacity
14
occasioned by the injury itself.1

311.

The goal of the compensation scheme of the Act is to provide recovery for a period

of disability experienced by an employee or worker as a result of a work-related injury. The
Act accomplishes its goal by providing a more certain remedy to employees so injured in
return for reduction in potential recovery, a goal which has been recognized and has withstood
constitutional challenge in Texas. Bridges v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 733 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1163 (1985).
312. See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1987). The supreme court,
in Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980), held: "The Legislature's purpose in
enacting article 8307c was to protect persons who are entitled to benefits under the Worker's
Compensation Law and to prevent them from being discharged by reason of taking steps to
collect such benefits." Id. at 453 (citing Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111, 115
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Accord Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co., 702
S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1985).
313. Subsequent employment, obtained under the economic "whip of necessity" does not
bar recovery for total and permanent incapacity under the Act, even though the jury may
consider the subsequently performed work in evaluating the total and permanent claim.
Consolidated Underwriters v. Whittaker, 413 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
314. Loss of earning capacity is calculated by statute which restricts recovery on compensation claims to the partial or total loss of earning capacity based on class of injury when
multiplied by the employee's average weekly wage rate. TEX. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,
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CONCLUSION

The remedy for retaliatory discharge created by the legislature
in the adoption of article 8307c has neither been the totally effective,
nor totally ineffective, remedy predicted by earlier commentators.
This provision does represent a significant legislative step toward the
modernization of concepts of the employment relationship in Texas
that may encourage further judicial rethinking of the "at will employment contract" traditionally recognized in the decisions of Texas
courts.3" 5
The remedy can be strengthened in two significant respects.
First, whether judicially, or by legislation,3 16 the presumption should
be recognized that a termination following in close proximity the
filing or settlement of a workers' compensation claim is based on a
retaliatory motive on the part of the employer. Prior decisions have
mandated a liberal construction of the Act for the benefit of Texas
workers. The decisions, properly relied upon by plaintiff's counsel
in building, pleading, and requesting the charge enhance the prospects
for terminated employees, even when the employer is able to assert
another reason for the termination. To the extent that article 8307c
has already changed employer practices and attitudes, these decisions
have served to support the change by affording employees an op-

§§ 10, I1 and 12 (Vernon 1967). See, e.g., Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 702 S.W.2d
259 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying formula for recovery for loss of
30%Vo
use of worker's hand to arrive at amount of recovery under the Act). The Act does not
compensate employees for actual loss of wages occasioned by injuries compensable under the
Act. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605 (1961).
315. Interestingly, in contrast to the narrow exception to the doctrine of "at will"
employment announced in Hauck, other jurisdictions have recognized the cause of action for
retaliatory discharge in response to the filing of a workers' compensation claim based on
public policy. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1938)
(adopting public policy exception to employment-at-will rule for retaliatory discharge actions);
Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984) (adopting public policy exception to
at-will employment rule for retaliatory termination actions). Subsequently, recovery of punitive
damages has been recognized as furthering the goal of enforcing employers not to discriminate.
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984) (employee could file action for
retaliatory discharge since action is necessary to enforce policy supporting the worker's
compensation scheme, including recovery of punitive damages).
316. Legislation introduced during the 70th Session of the Texas Legislature by Rep. Criss
(Dem. Galveston) would establish a presumption in favor of the employee who is discharged
after filing a workers' compensation claim-that the discharge was based on the employer's
discriminatory intent in violating the statute. Tex. H.B. 44, 70th Leg. (1987).
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portunity to establish their causes of action fairly at trial.3 17
The second development necessary to insure the effectiveness of
the remedy provided by article 8307c is the amendment of the statute
to provide for recovery of attorneys' fees in any action brought
under the provision in which the discharged worker prevails. The
absence of a statutory basis for the award of attorneys' fees in
wrongful discharge actions reduces the attractiveness of these cases
for counsel, particularly since discharged workers may suffer limited
losses for past and future wage losses as a result of their employment
at low wage levels. Application of contingent fee employment as the
basis for representation in such cases likely precludes representation
in many instances in which discharged workers may have meritorious,
but economically limited, claims for recovery. This is particularly
true in those situations in which the employee has mitigated damages
in good faith.
The goal of article 8307c can only be fully achieved when
meritorious claims are litigated successfully and the results serve to
discourage other instances of employer illegality in retaliating against
workers who assert their rights under the Act.3 ' Recovery of attorneys' fees and punitive damages are necessary complements to recovery of actual damages in achieving the broader goals of the Act.
Refinements in the case law will undoubtedly clarify the issues
relating to the pleading and proof burdens with regard to mitigation
of damages and other defensive matters. The current ambiguities
should benefit plaintiffs whose trial counsel prepare their cases well
and who benefit from lapses by defense counsel. Even in a truly
well-tried case, a plaintiff may not recover because of the employer's
sophistication in masking the true motivation for discharge. Moreover, the responsible worker who does mitigate his damages suffers

317. See Walters v. American States Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983) (citing Huffman
v. Southern Underwriters, 133 Tex. 354, 128 S.W.2d 4 (1939)).
318. Another aspect of Texas case law tending to promote the goals of the Act is
demonstrated by the decision in Artco-Bell Corp. v. Liberty-Mutual Ins. Co., 649 S.W.2d 722
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, no writ) in which the court held that the compensation insurance
carrier was under no obligation to reimburse an employer for damages assessed as a result of
a successful retaliatory discharge action brought by a compensation claimant. Id. at 724. The
court confined its ruling to a strict interpretation of the contract and did not discuss the public
policy implication. See id. Accord Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 122
Ill. App. 3d 717, 462 N.E.2d 660 (1984). For a recent review of developments on this point
nationally, see Holmes, Insurance Coverage for Claims of Wrongful Employment Termination,
91 DICK. L. REV. 895 (1987) (discussing the decision in Artco-Bell).
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a potential loss of remedy for a wrongful act of discharge as a result.
In order to both enhance the potential for recovery for meritorious
plaintiffs and to insure potential recovery sufficient to achieve the
goals of the Act through aggressive litigation of meritorious claims,
some fine-tuning of the remedy by the court and the legislature may
be necessary.

